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This paper is an analysis of Morskoy Sbornik with an
emphasis on history, missions and Soviet perceptions. First
there is a discussion of Morskoy Sbornik 's history, starting
with the Czarist period and then following it through the
period of the October Revolution.
Following this is an examination of Morskoy Sbornik 's
missions which are: first, to foster a unity of views;
second, to serve as a forum for debate; and third, to
disseminate useful information.
Next, Morskoy Sbornik is compared and contrasted to
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . Differences result because
Proceedings is a private organization whereas Morskoy Sbornik
is an official organ of the Soviet Union, which serves the
purposes of the state.
Last, the paper examines writings in Morskoy Sbornik on
three topics to define Soviet viewpoints from what is published
The three topics examined are: the maritime threat; command
and control in the Soviet Navy; and the commanding officer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Morskoy Sbornik
with an emphasis on history, missions and Soviet perceptions.
First there will be a discussion of Morskoy Sbornik'
s
history, starting with its beginning during the Czarist
period and then following it through the period of the
October Revolution. Since Morskoy Sbornik was one of a
very few military journals which survived the transition to
the Soviet period, this will provide a picture of its
development and use.
Following this will be an examination of Morskoy
Sbornik's missions, which are: first, to foster a unity
of views; second, to serve as a forum for debate; and third,
to disseminate useful information. Examples of how the
missions are being satisfied will be cited.
Next, in order to put matters in cultural perspective,
Morskoy Sbornik will be compared and contrasted to the U.S .
Naval Institute Proceedings . Comparing and contrasting the
two provides greater insight into how the Soviet Navy uses
this journal.
Last will be an attempt to define some Soviet viewpoints
from what they publish in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik . The
magazine contains articles indicative of Soviet naval thought
on important topics.

II. HISTORY OF MORSKOY SBORNIK
A. CZARIST PERIOD
Over 135 years ago, one of the oldest professional
magazines in the Soviet Union, Morskoy Sbornik
,
began
publication. On the occasion of the journal's 150th anni-
versary, Morskoy Sbornik published an article by Vice
Admiral Shchedrin depicting the magazine's colorful history.
Shchedrin stated that Morskoy Sbornik was founded on
the initiative of a group of leading Russian naval officers,
led by Vice Admiral F. Litke. Vice Admiral Litke was a
famous scientist and navigator. Chairman of the Naval
Science Committee, and founder of the Russian Geographic
Society. Morskoy Sbornik 's program was personally written
by Vice Admiral Litke; the first issue appeared in St.
Petersburg in March, 1848, in an edition of 400 copies.
From another article published in the same anniversary issue.
Vice Admiral V. Solov'yev quoted the Naval Science Committee's
objective in publishing the magazine was: "To see to the
dissemination of useful information among those serving in
the fleet" [Ref . 1] .
Vice Admiral Shchedrin stated in his 130th anniversary
article that Morskoy Sbornik was founded during a time of
the fleet's transition from sail to steam power. This was

a period of new discoveries and innovations in maritime
sciences and technology. A speaker to the USSR Academy of
Sciences on the journal's 75th anniversary was quoted as
saying
:
In its pages appeared not only naval affairs and tech-
nology in the broad sense, not only science in the
general: in the very first decade of its existence,
it became one of the most prominent exponents of the
literature and social thought which had begun to be so
powerfully expressed as a prelude to the great era of
reform. Morskoy Sbornik soon found its way into the
most remote and provincial corners of Russia, having
become one of the most popular magazines" [Ref . 2]
.
As the first naval monthly magazine in Russia, it
published articles on foreign navies and naval bases, wars
and incidents at sea, on voyages of individual ships and
squadrons, and many other maritime subjects. Morskoy
Sbornik became more and more popular as it was well received
by readers. However, the first five years it remained just
another departmental publication with a circulation of 1200
copies and consisting of five or six pages.
Shchedrin wrote that Morskoy Sbornik earned its popu-
larity during the period of the Crimean War, 1853-1856, and
in the ten-year period that followed. With its brilliant
victory at Sinop Bay, the Black Sea Fleet opened hostilities.
A model of the aggressive attack tactics of Nakhimov and
his pupils was demonstrated at this last great battle of
sailing fleets. The magazine gave detailed accounts of
combat actions which took place not only in this battle but
in all naval theaters.
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Morskoy Sbornik is also cited by Shchedrin as the most
complete source of information for people of that time con-
cerning military actions in the Crimea, the Baltics, Berents
and White Seas, and about the defense of Petropavlovsk-in-
Kamchatka.
Against a background of universal repression and sinister
silence, the role played by Morskoy Sbornik in the history
of Russian journalism and public opinion takes on special
significance. The uncommon voice of truth was heard in
the pages of this "bureaucratic magazine" [Ref . 3]
.
The other Russian publications were forbidden even to
reprint the occasional news dispatches published in the
military newspaper Russkiy Invalid until mid-1855. Morskoy
Sbornik ' s circulation and readership soared; it was only
natural that the magazine sold out moments after being
released. News from the front and the fleets printed in it
was copied by hand and circulated around the country for a
long time afterward.
A first during the Czarist period was Morskoy Sbornik 's
publication of casualty lists without regard to military
rank and its description of the courageous deeds of war
heroes and printing of their biographies, both officers' and
enlisted seamen's.
The article goes on to state that prominent men of the
time paid high tribute to such journalism and that N.
Chernyshevskiy spoke highly of
. . . the annals of the defense of Sevastopol, depicting
clearly the life of the Russian fighting man dying for

the Motherland and the life of the ordinary Russian
in general [Ref . 4]
.
In reference to the feature stories on rank-and-file
heroes which appeared in the magazine, Chernyshevskiy wrote:
Courageous defenders of the various strongholds of the
Naval Establishment, your names have not remained obscure;
they are recorded in the chronicle of that siege, which
thanks to your boundless valor obliged our very enemies
themselves to acknowledge the prowess of the Russian
fighting man [Ref. 5]
.
Although averting military disaster on land and at sea,
Russia was unable to avoid defeat in the War. This aroused
discontentment throughout the armed forces and the country
and intensified the crisis of the serf system. The Czarist
government was compelled to resort to political maneuvering,
a show of liberalism, and relaxation of censorship restric-
tions, of which Morskoy Sbornik took maximum advantage.
Vice Admiral Shchedrin quoted F. Veselago, a famous naval
historial, as saying:
[It] made itself a living organ, presenting truthfully
the state of naval affairs in Russia and addressing
itself ... in considerable measure to important
matters of state; it attracted as contributors some
very fine scientists and men of letters. Wide pub-
licity, replacing bureaucratic secrecy in the Navy
Ministry, evoked in Morskoy Sbornik free discussion
and heated controversy . '. '. '. [Ret . 6].
The magazine's progressive line was strongly approved
by many famous writers and thinkers in Russia. The editors
secured an excellent staff of writers and did not restrict
them to particular subjects. Morskoy Sbornik first printed
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"Frigate PALLADA," which was the travel essays of I. Goncharov,
who was the magazine's special correspondent on V. Putyatin's
expedition. Shchedrin thinks that many of Goncharov' s ideas
have not lost their relevance even today:
At sea . . . one can expect nothing but danger of one
kind or another but courage is innate in man; one must
rouse it in oneself and call on it for help, in order
to conquer the tendency of the soul to be timid, and
in order to steel the nerves by force of habit. And how
great is the reward! A long voyage fills the memory and
the imagination with marvelous pictures and significant
episodes, and enriches the mind with visual knowledge of
all the things one has known only by hearsay [Ref . 7]
.
The magazine published many sea stories and essays on
sea voyages, some of them written by the magazine's corre-
spondents on special assignment to Russian ships. Stories
from other sources were also published; "Travel Notes of a
Russian Seaman," the diaries of Ivan Lykov , a seaman of the 9th
Naval Barracks, which he kept during a cruise, were printed
in 1861. Morskoy Sbornik also printed many articles and
essays written by prominent Russian writers, scientists,
pedagogues, seafarers and social activists.
Shchedrin notes that many difficult and vital issues were
commented on by Morskoy Sbornik . The magazine supported the
elimination of corporal punishment of servicemen, the reorgan-
ization of the training, education and jurisprudence systems.
It also criticized procedures based on serfdom in the army
and navy. As the magazine's popularity grew, so did its
circulation; by 1854 it reached 6000 copies. This figure
11

was quite remarkable for that time; it even surpassed the
circulation of Sovremennik
,
which was considered the most
progressive and widely read magazine of its time. "Morskoy
Sbornik had subscribers in 70 Russian cities and in many
foreign countries" [Ref . 8]
.
Morskoy Sbornik was attracting wide public attention and
ranked among the most progressive publications of that time.
Shchedrin points out that, besides social-political
subjects, many professional subjects were discussed in the
magazine, the transition from sail to steam, from wood to
metal, from smooth-bore to rifled guns. G. Butakov, the
founder of "steam tactics," wrote several articles for the
magazine. Shchedrin quotes from an article in Morskoy
Sbornik concerning steam frigates in action during the
Crimean War:
. . .
with their wartime combat exploits in the defense
of Sevastopol, they not only taught us how and with what
steam-powered ships can and should provide support for
ground forces during joint operations . . . but they
also demonstrated to us that such a high-minded spirit
of unity between a state's land and naval forces can
accomplish wonders .... [Ref. 9].
Vice Admiral Shchedrin states that the Czarist government
did not look kindly on the progressive nature of the maga-
zine. As Russia's internal situation became more stable and
the wounds inflicted by the war healed, the Czarist regime
reverted to its old ways. The government began to censor
Morskoy Sbornik to keep it under control. There were even
attempts to close the magazine on the pretext that it was
12

"unprofitable." But its readers came to its rescue and it
continued to publish, although it had to avoid controversial
social -political subjects.
Besides addressing important problems o£ naval strategy,
it became a platform for the dissemination of combat experi-
ence at sea, knowledge relating to seafaring, shipbuilding,
the utilization of ordnance and the operation of machinery.
Articles appeared by famous admirals and other officers,
including S. Makarov, G. Butakov, I. Likhachev and A. Popov;
engineers S. Dzhevelskiy, I. Bubanov and A. Krylov; and
specialists in ordnance and in history. Morskoy Sbornik
has been referred to as a unique naval encyclopedia of that
period.
Vice Admiral Solov'yev's article notes that the work of
Vice Admiral S. Makarov was published in several issues of
the magazine in 1897. Makarov 's "Thoughts on Some Questions
of Naval Tactics" proved to be an enormous contribution
to the development of Russian thinking on military theory.
Morskoy Sbornik also printed many articles concerning
the experience of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, as well as World War I.
B. SOVIET PERIOD
During the period of the Revolution, the printed
word underwent radical reforms .... The Revolution
advanced new goals, pointed the way to new tasks. Those
who refused to understand this found themselves shunted
aside; the Soviet authorities settled their fate with a
13

short obituary .... In this way many of the old
military magazines and almost all newspapers ceased to
exist .... Having secured for itself moral support
and ideological leadership, Morskoy Sbornik . . .
cheerfully joined . . . the ranks of Soviet military-
scientific thought" [Ref . 10]
.
Vice Admiral Shchedrin points out that Morskoy Sbornik
was one of a very few Russian military journals which
joined the side of the Soviet Revolution without hesitation.
The magazine printed the edicts of the Soviet authorities
and helped them to fight other organs of the press which
stood in their way.
In discussing those early days of the Revolution,
Shchedrin remarks that everything was in short supply, not
just food but also paper, printer's ink, skilled journalists
and printers. However, essentials which were needed for
those who were "serving the Revolution" were found. Morskoy
Sbornik was concerning itself with the development of Soviet
naval thinking, the theoretical basis of which was the
writings and practical activity of Lenin on the construction
and leadership of the Soviet Army and Navy.
According to to Shchedrin, on 29 November 1917, Morskoy
Sbornik was placed under the control of the Naval General
Staff. S. P. Lukashevich was appointed its first editor-in-
chief. The Communist Party put the magazine at the service
S. P. Lukashevish, former NCO and radio telegrapher on





of the Soviet Fleet which was created to defend the gains
of the working class.
The magazine published the decrees of the Soviet
authorities, orders of the naval command, and news on the
revolutionary movement in the fleet. News of the civil war
was reported; an account was given of the Baltic Fleet's
Arctic cruise in 1918 and of actions by Soviet river and
lake flotillas. Morskoy Sbornik printed articles on military-
political subjects, on naval strategy, on foreign navies and
their performance in the World War. Morskoy Sbornik played
an important part in shaping the views of Soviet officers.
In the years 1922-1929, a great deal was accomplished by
the magazine, especially after the decision of the 10th RKPB
(Bolshevik) Congress and the 9th All-Russian Congress of
Soviets on fleet construction. Shchedrin quotes E.
Pantserzhanskiy , the Assistant for Naval Affairs to the
Commander-in-Chief of All the Armed Forces of the Republic,
and y. Zof , Commisar of Naval Forces of the Republic, stated
in 1923:
The Morskoy Sbornik of today, casting off routine
and striding boldly ahead, is blazing new trails of
scientific research for construction of the Workers'
and Peasants' Red Fleet [Ref. 11].
The Shchedrin article goes on to say that Morskoy Sbornik
,
in accordance with the missions assigned to the Navy by the
Party at the 10th RKPB (Bolshevik) Congress, set up its own
program and published it in the last issue of 1926. It
stated that the missions of the magazine would be:
15

Elucidation and development of naval political subjects
and matters of reconstituting the naval forces of the
USSR; exploration of the most important problems of
naval strategy, tactics and organization as they stand
today; working out problems of USSR naval defense and
of joint Army-Navy operations; discussion of the naval
education, instruction and training of naval personnel;
study of the combat and organizational experience of the
imperialist and civil wars at sea; discussion of the
latest developments in naval technology; systematic
reporting of information on the state and development
of the naval forces of foreign states; and a survey of
the latest naval and military literature, both Russian
and foreign [Ref. 12].
The magazine, as noted by Vice Admiral Shchedrin, began
to devote attention to the development of the new science of
operations. Considerable space was given to the analysis
of the combat activity of river flotillas during the civil
war, and to study of the potential of fleet support to the
seaward flank of ground forces, stressing the coordination
of all forces involved in an operation.
The problems discussed by Morskoy Sbornik in those days
were often "coastal" in nature because, according to Shchedrin,
the pre-war Navy was supposed to perform primarily defensive
missions in close coordination with ground forces. But, as
World War II grew closer, there began to appear more and
more often articles on the tactics of submarines, naval
aviation, battleships and cruisers, against enemy lines of
communication near enemy bases and in combat on the high
seas
.
Vice Admiral Solov'yev's article noted that the magazine
called upon Soviet seamen-scientists to develop a Soviet
16

naval strategy based on Marxist-Leninist methodology and
teachings on war and armed forces. Western naval theories,
especially the Mahan-Kolombos theory of sea power, were
subjected to sharp criticism.
Solov'yev further notes that these calls were not left
unanswered. From the articles being published, it was
obvious that Soviet naval operational strategy was developing
and staking out a position midway between strategy and tactics.
Such ideas had never existed before and still do not exist
in western military and naval strategic thinking.
By the start of World War II, according to Solov'yev,
Soviet naval theory was considered to be well advanced.
During the war and post-war period, Morskoy Sbornik did a
great deal to generalize and disseminate combat experience.
A series of articles by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet
Union I. Isakov, "The Navy of the Soviet Union in the Great
Patriotic War," served to generalize material on all of the
great events of the war at sea. There was also quite a
number of serious articles generalizing war experience which
were written by the principal department heads of the Soviet
Naval Academy.
The Vice Admiral Shchedrin pieces point out that Morskoy
Sbornik also published information on enemy ordnance, tech-
nology, tactics, and on the operations of the allied navies.
The rule "studying what was needed in the war" was scrupulously
17

followed by the magazine. Applying this rule, articles were
published which analyzed battles and operations, tactics and
organization, inter-branch operations and many other subjects
of military science.
According to Shchedrin, Morskoy Sbornik is credited
with helping Soviet officers acquire the knowledge and skills
needed for educational work on long ocean cruises and the
capability to maintain a high state of combat readiness.
The magazine's efforts are focused on these difficult tasks.
In 1973 the Navy Military Council ordered the celebration
of the magazine's 125th birthday. Shchedrin states that most
of the national newspapers in the Soviet Union commented on
its jubilee. Morskoy Sbornik was awarded an Honor Certificate
by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 5 March
1973 for its services in the field of communist education of
Soviet naval personnel.
The magazine has popularized literature having to
do with ships, seas and oceans. It has shown how the
history of the fleet can be reflected in commemorative
propaganda. Incidentally, for its well-presented com-
memorative propaganda . . . Morskoy Sbornik has been
awarded the Diploma, 1st Class, ot the Central Council
of All-Russian Society for Preservation of Historical
and Cultural Monuments; and for its effective propa-
ganda on the achievements of science and technology,
it has been awarded the bronze medal of VDNKh (Exhibition
of Achievements of the National Economy) [Ref. 13].
In conclusion. Vice Admiral Shchedrin notes that Morskoy
Sbornik ' s popularity continues to grow. In the past ten
years, its circulation has more than doubled. This is because
its editorial staff is responsive to the reader's needs and
does everything possible to accomplish its mission.
18

III. MISSIONS OF MORSKQY SBORNIK
MoTskoy Sbornik appears to have three basic missions.
First, and probably most important, is to foster a unity of
views on the character and form of waging a future war at
sea. Second is a forum for discussion and debate of important
issues of naval theory. And third is the dissemination of
useful information which will allow them to further improve
the combat readiness of the Soviet Navy. Since the magazine
is an official press organ, these missions and the program
to accomplish them has met with the approval of the CPSU
and Navy General Staff.
This section will discuss each of the basic missions,
explaining their importance in terms of Soviet political
culture and will cite examples of how the magazine is
attempting to accomplish each mission. Concluding this
section will be an evaluation of Morskoy Sbornik 's program
to meet its requirements.
A. UNITY OF VIEWS
Soviet Navy training, as in all the Soviet armed forces,
is permeated with political ideology. Soviet military
docctine is developed from military science which, in turn,
is based upon Marxist-Leninist teachings and the experience
of wars. Soviet military science also uses the results of
research from the technical, natural and social sciences
19

for developing new means of warfare and supporting combat
operations
.
Intensive political indoctrination is an essential part
of Soviet naval training. For the enlisted ranks, the
indoctrination involves patriotic lectures (usually on World
War II), emphasizing points relevant to current training;
current events in a Marxist-Leninist perspective; and up-
dates on Party activities. However, for officers, this
indoctrination is intended to teach the applications of
Marxist-Leninist methods of military-scientific analysis
and development of standard solutions for any given combat
situation. This direct relationship between military science
and political ideology provides the basis for the unity of
views which is of utmost concern to the Soviet military
leadership. Given a specific military situation, a group
of Soviet officers theoretically should be able to analyze
and arrive at the same solution independently. This can
facilitate planning and coordination, particularly in
combat situations in which communications with friendly
forces may be reduced.
These political-ideological considerations go far beyond
the Marxist-Leninist immutable laws of warfare and the influ-
ence of such thought upon military decision-making. This
philosophy is also reflected in the organization for political
administration, which extends from the Main Political
Administration at the Ministry of Defense level, though the
20

Main Political Directorate of the navy and political officers
in individual units. This organization plays an important
part in shipboard organization, personnel control mechanisms
and training methods.
This view can be traced back to the political culture
of the Russian village, Edward L. Keenan, in his paper,
"Russian Political Culture" (Russian Research Center, Harvard
University, July, 1976), states that the primary objective
of the village was survival . Not the preservation of a way
of life but life itself, human life, vital livestock, and
crops. The difference between prosperity and disaster for
the village as well as the household was precarious.
In the peasant village organization, according to
Keenan, the smallest political unit was the village, not
the individual or the family since they were too prone to
disease or sudden calamity. In this organization the
interests of all were subordinated to the village. Since
all the households depended upon each other for their
survival (survival of the village)
,
when one household met
with disaster, the others would come to its aid. This was a
system of reciprocating mechanisms and its virtues were
known to every member of the culture. They understood
the importance of the village organization in terms of their
own survival. In rare cases when an individual would refuse
to come to another's aid, the village could beat the offender




Given the precarious environment they all lived in, all of the
adult members would have at one time experienced the benefits
of the system; and under normal circumstances would not only
acquiesce but would force others to do so in their own
interest.
Keenan wrote that the Russian peasant's view of man was
a low one. He was fearful of man's inclination to be weak
and dangerous to the vital interests of the group and con-
sequently he treated others as well as himself in an
authoritarian manner. Man's self-interest had to be con-
trolled for the good of the village.
The paper also notes that decision making stressed the
interests of the group over those of the individual.
Importance was therefore attached to a corporate form of
decision making. All of the village elders were both
encouraged and obliged to speak openly on an issue that was
to be decided. Once a decision was reached, they were
required to join the majority in unanimous adherance to the
policy decided upon. It was not permitted to continue
partisan discussion on the issue once the group had come
to a decision.
Since the present and past Soviet leadership is from
Great Russian peasant stock and considering the harsh
history of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that
great importance is placed upon "unity of views."
22

One example found in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik of
fostering a unity of views is concerned with military
discipline as a means to increase combat readiness. The
series of articles which appear were probably generated
in 1977 by the adoption of a new Constitution in the Soviet
Union.
The series starts out with an article written by Admiral
of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov in May of 1978.
Gorshkov writes that, as a result of profound qualitative
change in the armed forces during the last decade and the
adoption of a new Constitution in the Soviet Union, a par-
tial revision of Navy Shipboard Regulations will soon become
effective. He states:
The Navy Shipboard Regulations are a collection of
immutable laws governing naval service. They represent
the active experience of more than one generation of
navymen , experience tried and proven in countless naval
cruises and campaigns and in fierce battles and engage-
ments, experience carefully collected, bit by bit, and
included in the concise lines of articles they contain.
They are the original source and basis of all manuals,
handbooks, and rules developing and defining in their
organization and training, as well as of the daily per-
formance of duty and the shipboard regulations [Ref . 14]
.
The author is trying to establish a unity of views
within the Soviet Navy by strongly emphasizing the validity
and importance of Navy Shipboard Regulations. He appeals
to the reader's emotions by bringing up past campaigns and
battles. Gorshkov goes on to state that navy life is per-
meated with these regulations and that the most important
23

task of a ship's command is to organize all of the crew's
activities in strict accordance with Navy Shipboard Regulations
Admiral Gorshkov sums up his piece by stating:
Absolute, efficient, and precise fulfillment of the
requirements of the Regulations and the organization of
the daily life and activities of the Navy in full
accordance with their letter and spirit will make it
possible to maintain ships, units, and forces in con-
stant combat readiness and guarantee an immediate
rebuff to any aggressor [Ref . 15]
.
Morskoy Sbornik published another article in February,
1979, which stressed military discipline (strict adherance
to regulations) as a guarantee of increased combat readiness.
This article was submitted by Vice Admiral V. Sidorov,
Commander of the Baltic Fleet.
The article begins with a brief discussion of Lenin's
views on military discipline. V. I. Lenin considered
military discipline as the key to combat readiness. Vice
Admiral Sidorov writes that:
In order to win, taught our leader, iron war discipline
is needed. The army of a socialist state should consist
of conscientious conditioned fighting men, welded to-
gether by a unity of will and actions [Ref. 16].
Lenin urged ".
. . not from fear, but from conscience,
carry out all laws of the Red Army, all orders, maintain
discipline in it in any way possible .... [Ref. 17]
.
The role of discipline in maintaining high combat
readiness under contemporary conditions has grown immeasur-
ably. This is due to the rapid development of combat equip-
ment in the armed forces and changes which have occurred in
their organization and means of armed conflict.
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Admiral Sedorov goes on to say that the Central Committee
of the CPSU has emphasized that military discipline and
order is an important condition to a high state of combat
readiness. He ends his article with the statement:
Military discipline is the foundation of combat
readiness and a guarantee of success in carrying out
the responsible missions of training and duty which
face the fleet. And the more we do for the further
strengthening of discipline, the more powerful and
combat capable our fleet's ranks will be [Ref. 18].
Vice Admiral A. Plekhanov, Chief of the Political Branch
of the Naval Base and Naval Schools in Leningrad, wrote an
article which was printed in September, 1980. This article
also begins with a discussion of Lenin's views on military
discipline. Vice Admiral Plekhanov states that Lenin had
declared war on anything that undermines discipline in the
armed forces and that he (lenin) demanded absolute efficiency,
precision and self -discipline in the execution of orders and
instructions
.
The article states that the CPSU, in its efforts to
increase the Soviet Union's defensive capabilities, is guided
by Lenin's views on military discipline. The CPSU is doing
everything possible to ensure "that the Soviet Armed Forces
are a precise, well -coordinated organism with a high degree
of organization and discipline . . . ." [Ref. 19].
Vice Admiral Plekhanov is also fostering a unity of views.
He is stressing the point that everyone must be precise in
the execution of orders because that is the only way to
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increase the combat readiness and efficiency of the Soviet
Navy.
A fourth and final article used in this particular
example to link military discipline with combat readiness
is an editorial that was published by Morskoy Sbornik in
October, 1981.
This article begins with some of Lenin's views on
military discipline. A fundamental Leninist principle of
Soviet military construction is conscientious and firm
military discipline. Lenin saw the significance of disci-
pline primarily in that it knits fighting men into a single
combat organism and coordinates their actions and thereby
multiplies their power.
The force of a hundred, according to a figure of speech
of Lenin's, can exceed the force of a thousand if the
hundred is organized and joined by a unity of will
[Ref . 20]
.
Today, because the development and employment of new
weapons requires great coordination between large numbers of
servicemen, the importance of military discipline has grown
manifold. The article also states:
Discipline is not only a most important condition
for victory in battle, but also the foundation of the
constant combat readiness of naval forces in peace
time. Achieving the gaol that each sub-element, each
ship and each unit be a model of strick adherance to
order and the rules established by Soviet laws and
military regulations is one of the central tasks of
commanding officers, staffs, political organs, and




The rest of the article discusses how political organs
can help the commanding officer and his staff to achieve
increased military discipline. The term "unity of views"
is used repeatedly.
The articles cited in this example have several common
factors that link them together. First, authorship of the
articles certainly adds to their credibility and importance
to the readers. Writings by Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union S. Gorshkov, Vice Admiral V. Sidorov, Commander
of the Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral A. Plekhanov, Chief of the
Political Branch of the Naval Base and Naval Schools in
Leningrad and an article by the editorial staff of Morskoy
Sbornik are impressive and would attract the attention and
close scrutiny of the readership. If comparable men in the
U.S. Navy (Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief of
a Fleet, etc.) published pieces on a particular subject,
that would attract great attention.
A degree of emotion and intensity was inherent in the
articles because of phrases and ideological references used.
Each of the articles referred to Lenin's views on military
discipline which gives the main topic an ideological basis.
Gorshkov's article also draws upon the victorious battles
of the Russian Navy, "fires of the revolution" and the
"glorious sailors of October" for added intensity.
Certain phrases, some exactly alike and others closely
worded, are used throughout the writings cited. The phrase
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"unity of will" is used in two of the articles; Vice Admiral
Sidorov uses it and it is used again by the editorial staff
of Morskoy Sbornik . This is a very powerful phrase because
its concept goes back to the political culture of the Russian
village, as discussed earlier. Lenin, as quoted earlier,
even writes of the concept. Admiral Gorshkov also uses a
very similar phrase, "inseparable unit." He uses it in
reference to the conduct of all organizational activities.
Phrases like "strict adherance to orders and rules" and
"precision in execution of orders and instructions" are used
throughout in regard to strengthening military discipline.
And this type of discipline fosters a "well coordinated
organism" which is considered a requirement for the employ-
ment of modern military forces. Each article also states the
policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to require
unswerving adherance to the requirements of the military
oath and regulations.
The authors, emotion and intensity, frequency and simi-
larity of expressions, and references to ideological/histori-
cal/political basis all make for a very powerful effort to
foster a unity of views concerning the precondition of mili-
tary discipline for combat readiness.
B. FORUM FOR DISCUSSION, DEBATE AND EXPLORATION OF
IMPORTANT ISSUES
Although the second mission is treated separately, its
ultimate objective is the same as the first mission--to foster
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a unity of views. Because o£ its deep roots in Soviet
political culture the concept is extremely important in
the Soviet Union. Before establishing any policy, the
Soviet leadership wants to ensure the validity of it.
That is, it must be ultimately derived from Marxist-Leninist
philosophy, which recognizes immutable laws of society and
war, strict methods for analysis, and ideologically correct
solutions
.
In order to develop a "correct" theory, experts must be
allowed to discuss and debate the issues with each other in
an open way as in the Russian village organization. In this
way problems and questions can be resolved using a Marxist-
Leninist methodology before a doctrine is established.
In the Soviet military system the expression of unofficial
views is through military science. Unlike military doctrine,
which represents the official policy of the Soviet Union,
differences in opinion may be expressed and at times are
even encouraged. Admiral Chernavin, Chief of the Main Naval
Staff, noted:
On the whole, debates on Naval theory in the pages
of the Soviet Naval Digest have a great significance,
since from lack of unanimity of opinion on many theoret-
ical problems, serious difficulties sometimes arise in
our practical activity. In addition, the solution of
a whole complex of problems in Navy theory is a braod
field of endeavor for naval officers, naval educational
institutions and the Navy's scientific institutes
[Ref. 22].
Sharp debates published in Morskoy Sbornik are rare;
however, they are not unknown. Presently there is an intense
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ongoing debate within the pages of the magazine. The debate
began in April, 1981, with the first installment of a two-
part article written by Vice Admiral K. Stalbo entitled
"Some Issues of the Theory of the Development and Employment
of the Navy," This article has expressed the author's views
on the subject matter, content and structural pattern of the
theory of naval development and employment. Vice Admiral
Stalbo remarked that there is an urgent need for a systematic
examination of the primary elements of this theory, for their
association into a logically connected concept and for a
definition of its structure and missions. This has resulted
in sharp critical responses from other senior Soviet flag
officers
.
The first response to Vice Admiral Stalbo 's article was
from Rear Admiral G. Kostev in November, 1981. According to
Robert Suggs in his article, "The Soviet Navy: Changing of
the Guard?" (Proceedings , April, 1983), Rear Admiral Kostev
is the head of the naval faculty of the Lenin Political-
Military Academy. As a political officer, it has been
suggested that Rear Admiral Kostev is speaking for the Navy
Political Directorate and, therefore, the Communist Party.
This would mean that he has opened the door for attacks on
Vice Admiral Stalbo 's theories.
According to Kostev, Stalbo 's view of naval theory is
too narrow and deals with it as if it were independent from
the study of military science. In other words, naval theory
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falls within the framework of a single military science.
Because the branches of the Armed Forces have specific inherent
features they must be viewed in a differentiated manner by
theories of branches of the Armed Forces. However, it must be
stressed that they fall within the framework of military
science because their organizational development, preparation
and employment are accomplished both independently and in
cooperation with each other. Above all, providing the
methodological framework for all theoretical research is
the Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
Suggs notes that Stalbo has focused on combat at sea and
neglected other vital areas. Naval theory must examine armed
conflict not only at sea but also on the land and in the air
within the framework of limits of actions by naval forces.
An integrated approach is also necessary in order to determine
ways of achieving a common goal for all branches of the armed
forces
.
Kostev does not agree with Stalbo 's organization of the
general part of naval theory. This general part gives the
theory a logical basis; without it, the theory of the navy
would appear to be a conglomerate of separate unrelated
theories. Kostev's objections to Stalbo's organization can
be summarized in the following statement:
It is the fundamental basis of the system of know-
ledge about the navy. That means it must examine only
categories, patterns, and principles "nourishing" all
component parts of the theory of the navy. This is the
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definition o£ the general part which the author himself
provides. In our view there is no need to include in it
everything that "does not fit" within the framework of
special theories. It seems to us that this leads to
inaccuracy in presenting the content of the general
part [Ref . 23]
.
He goes on to say that it is not correct to include in
the general part of the theory a category such as sea power
of the state. This is a very broad concept which is a
component part of the state's entire might, which is examined
by Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army. These
are questions that should be dealt with at the highest levels
of the state.
Finally, further scientific classification of the con-
stantly growing knowledge and clarification of terminology in
the theory of the Navy is needed.
Admiral V. Chernavin was the author of the second article
which was critical of Vice Admiral Stalbo's two-part series.
Admiral V. Chernavin is a nuclear submariner who was the
North Fleet Commander until November of 1981 when he was
promoted to Chief of the Main Navy Staff.
Suggs points out that Chernavin's article which appeared
in January, 1982, warns that this may be a heated debate in
which objective and subjective difficulties must be overcome.
According to Suggs, Chernavin emphasizes the need for con-
sideration of naval from the viewpoints of independent,
combined and joint operations, which opposes Stalbo's focus
on combat sea. Chernavin states:
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Today, in essence, there are no particularly well-
defined sphers of armed conflict. Each branch of
the armed forces is capable of bringing force to bear
on the enemy in whatever physical environment he may
be- -on land, in the air, on the water or under the
water. Victory is achieved by coordinated efforts,
and this gives rise to the necessity of integrating
all knowledge about warfare within the framework and
limits of a single, unified military science [Ref. 24].
Chernavin feels that their first concern should be the
development of a more precise terminology, starting with the
selection of a name for the theory dealing with study of the
navy. He also states that ".
. .
there is not yet any
unanimity of opinion on this subject" [Ref. 25] . He adds
that Vice Admiral Stalbo's term "theory of the development
and deployment of the Navy" is not comprehensive enough and
that a number of important elements will be excluded from
the systematic structure of knowledge about the navy.
Chernavin notes that an analysis of some particular
problems and categories is given in Stalbo's general section
on the theory of the navy. Some of these (i.e., sea supremacy
problems of balancing the navy, and national sea power) cannot
be comprehensively covered in the general section alone.
Part of the problem lies in the definitions used. For
example, Vice Admiral Stalbo's article states:
The theory of naval strategy is a system of scientifi-
cally based, logically arranged concepts tested in
practice, as well as of knowledge about the principles
of training and employing naval forces in warfare at
sea, during the performance of strategic, operational




Admiral Chernavin feels that the definition given in the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia is more precise, strict, and
accurate. It reads:
Naval strategy studies the nature of warfare in sea
and ocean theaters of military operations and develops
methods of preparing for and conducting operations and
battles, both independently and in conjunction with
commands (forces) of other branches of the armed
forces [Ref . 27]
.
Suggs points out that there is also a disagreement with
Stalbo's treatment of the principle of massing of forces.
Chernavin states that the principle of massing of forces
has acquired a new significance under today's conditions of
warfare. He adds that Vice Admiral Stalbo has failed to
consider the latest developments in combat capabilities, the
global scale and rapid flow of combat accion. The massing
of forces and means is more important than ever. Because in
order to guarantee the destruction of important targets in
a short period of time, concentration of firepower is essential
It is further pointed out that the time factor has been com-
pletely disregarded in Stalbo's treatment of combat readiness,
command, and concentration of forces. Admiral Chernavin notes
that modern command, control and communications systems have
expanded the capabilities of rapid organization and close
coordination of joint combat operations. It is implied that
Stalbo is unaware that, as the conditions and nature of war
change, the content and form of principles of military and
naval art must also change.
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In concluding his article. Admiral Chernavin encourages
the development of this debate in the pages of Morskoy
Sbornik . It will serve as a good starting point for
thorough discussion and objective substantiation of a
theory of the navy that will reflect modern day conditions.
The third article in the debate is by Admiral V. Sysoyev,
Commander of the Marshall Grechko Naval Academy, which is the
highest educational institution in the Soviet Navy. This
academy, as described by Suggs, is similar to a combination
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School,
and the Center for Naval Analysis. Admiral Sysoyev is con-
sidered to be one of the Soviet Navy's leading management and
command and control theorists.
Admiral Sysoyev has the same criticism as Rear Admiral
Kostev and Admiral Chernavin on a number of issues. For
example, he feels that Stalbo's term "the theory of develop-
ment and employment of the Navy" is not comprehensive enough
to properly cover the system of knowledge about the Navy.
He suggests the term "naval theory" better corresponds to
the broad content of knowledge being studied.
Suggs notes that Sysoyev also thinks that Stalbo's treat-
ment of the general part of the theory is too broad because
he includes problems such as sea power of the state. This
is a subject that should be considered by policy makers at
the national level, not the Navy.
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As Chernavin had done, Sysoyev emphasized the time factor
as being extremely important in both tactical and operational
coordination. Paralleling Chernavin's views, he lists
factors that drove the development of management theory during
World War II; they included the global scope of naval opera-
tions, the role of submarines and carrier-based aviation
(the most versatile fleet arms) , and an increase in the
importance of joint army and navy actions, especially
amphibious landings.
Sysoyev says that a contemporary theory of command and
control must develop as the theory of control of the Navy
as a whole. Also, the theory of control of the Navy must
have as a basis the laws and principles of the science of
control of the Soviet state as well as on theories of
control of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. This, of
course, must take into consideration specific missions,
organizational and employment features of the Navy. Suggs
states that Sysoyev views the principle of one-man command,
which he sees as computer aided, centralized decision-
making, as the most important aspect of management. The
freedom of independent decision-making at all levels of
command is advocated.
In April, 1982, Captain 1st Rank B. Makeyev , a candidate
of naval science, entered the debate with his article
entitled "Some Views on the Theory of Naval Weaponry."
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Part two of the Stalbo series discussed the naval armament
theory. Stalbo calls the theory of naval armament the
core of the theory of Navy construction.
The theory of Navy Armament works up, researches
and studies the problems involved in determining the
principal directions of Navy development and in creating
the necessary material means for waging war in theaters
of operation, including basing systems [Ref. 28].
The article supports points made by Kostev, Chernavin
and Sysoyev concerning Stalbo 's omission of military, politi-
cal and economic factors in weapons development and his desire
to have the navy assume a prominence in the Soviet defense
establishment
.
Makeyev believes that naval weapons development is based
on decisions of defense planners who must consider the missions
and need of all branches of the Armed Forces, the economic
capacity of the state, and the political-strategic situation.
The decisions of these planners are based on many factors
external to the navy; this may alter basic mission of the
Navy or any other branch.
An article by Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain 1st Rank
Yu. Borisov appeared in July, 1982. Both authors, according
to Suggs, are assigned to the Grechko Academy political
faculty. The article, entitled "Methodological Problems of
the Theory of Building a Navy and Employing It in Battle,"
attacks Vice Admiral Stalbo primarily with Marxist-Leninist
ideology. Gulin and Borisov criticize Stalbo for his lack
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of a Marxist-Leninist philosophy; that is, his failure to
evaluate all social life, including war from the social
class aspect. Vice Admiral Stalbo's failure to consider the
social class aspect leads him to six basic errors.
First, certain propositions in Stalbo's article are
reviewed fully from the technical and operational -technical
point of view. Modern equipment and weapons constitute one
of the principal factors of naval development, but not the
only one. Stalbo ignores a principal driving force, the fact
that world imperialism, in its preparations for warfare
against the Soviet Union, is counting on naval power. It is
this factor that leads to the development of sophisticated
weapon systems and optimal methods of warfare. Strategic
objectives are determined by politics.
Second, in his discussion of the significance of the
moral factor in warfare, Stalbo completely disregards the
class approach. To document his claim that moral factors
in war have always been significant, he quotes historical
military figures. However, according to Gulin and Borisov,
military leaders of the past only had a limited understanding
of the subject. Only a Marxist-Leninist view enables one to
understand the true significance of the moral factor and make
full use of it in war.
Third, Stalbo fails to achieve a proper balance of
political and military-technical elements in his analysis
of the main directions of naval development. Stalbo
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accorded the theory o£ weapons development a predominant
role in the overall development of the navy. He failed to
estimate the significance of the military and military-
technical policies of the Party and Soviet military doctrine.
Fourth, Stalbo fails to criticize bourgeois naval ideas.
Naval problems today are considered an important part in the
ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. The
capitalists are trying to distort the essence and social
purpose of the sea power of the Soviet state. This demands
that great effort be applied toward well -supported criticism
of bourgeois naval theories.
Fifth, Stalbo 's treatment of naval theory as separate
from other areas of military service. Military science is
very complex and it is broken down into different areas which
are studied by the theories of the Branches of the Armed
Forces. Theory of the Navy has its o\m subject area deter-
mined by the peculiarities of naval combat; however, it must
be studied within the framework of military science and
Marxist-Leninist laws of war.
Sixth, the theory of naval education and training is given
an unsuitably subordinate polition. The authors feel that
this is a full-fledged element of naval theory. This is
because man is still the decisive force and the process of
training and education permeates the entire theory of
building the navy and using it in combat.
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Captain 1st Rank N. Prumov's article, "The Theory of
Military Training and Education- -A Component Part of Naval
Theory," was published in November, 1982. Captain 1st Rank
Priemov, professor and doctor of naval science, who is
believed to be associated with the Grechko Naval Academy,
repeats the attack on Stalbo for assigning a subordinate
position to the theory of military training and education.
He views the theory of training and education as a major
component of naval theory, equivalent to the general theory
of the navy. The author states that the theory of military
training and education of the navy is based on Marxist-
Leninist teachings about war and the army, the Marxist-
Leninist theory of social control, the theory of military
training and education of personnel of the Soviet armed
forces, and naval and military art. Priemov believes that
this is the proper hierarchical sequence of theories.
The importance of the party principle is cited by Priemov.
It has influence on training methodology and expresses the
dependence of the goals, tasks and content of training on the
policies of the Communist Party, which has the leading posi-
tion in the equipping and preparation of the Soviet armed
forces. The party principle should be infused in all training
Vice Admiral Stalbo 's article (two-part series), "Some
Issues of the Theory of the Development and Deployment of the
Navy," has been attacked on several fronts by his critics.
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Suggs emphasizes that these critics are powerful senior
naval officers. In summary, Suggs notes, there are three
serious areas of concern.
1. Ideological
Stalbo misunderstands the basic position of Marxist-
Leninist philosophy in theories concerning the development
and use of the armed forces and does not present the party
principle adequately. Because of these shortcomings, he
ignores the importance of the Party in setting military
policy, gives an undeservedly high position to the Soviet
Navy in the overall scheme of the Soviet armed forces, and
treats naval theory as an independent subject. This impairs
his knowledge of the development, content, and significance
of military science. It also led him to incorrect explana-
tions of naval technology, naval history and the significance
of moral factors in war. He developed theories concerning
sea power of the state, which should only be developed at a
high national level. Furthermore, Stalbo fails to defend




Stalbo 's term for the area of study, the theory of
development and employment of the navy, has been unanimously
criticized as being too narrow. Criticism has also been
leveled at his organization of the fields of knowledge
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within the area of naval theory, the subjects and objects
in these fields and the terms and definitions used.
3. Operational
Stalbo's critics complain that he does not understand
the principles of concentration of forces and combat readi-
ness and has completely neglected the importance of the time
factor. He fails to pay attention to joint and combined
operations, focusing on combat at sea, which places him out-
side the mainstream of modern Soviet military science. Also,
he does not understand or give proper emphasis to the factors
which drive the development of command, control and communica-
tions systems. The most serious attacks concern the lack of
unity of tactical and operational views. This criticism came
from the operational as well as educational and research
communities. Stalbo was also criticized for his lack of
response to the modern conditions and nature of warfare.
This ongoing theoretical debate in Morskoy Sbornik
is providing a forum for the discussion of many longstanding
issues concerning the Soviet Navy. Admiral Chernavin ended
his article by noting:
In conclusion we should like to emphasize that
this developing debate in the pages of Soviet Naval
Digest will serve as a good starting point for tho-
rough discussion and objective substantiation of a
theory of the Navy which will meet the needs of
military practice and reflect the present day con-
dition of our Navy [Ref. 29]
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The ideologically correct "solution" will ultimately
become doctrine and this will provide a unanimity of opinion
within the Soviet Navy.
Although not as intense there is another ongoing
debate within the pages o£ Morskoy Sbornik
.
This particular
debate started in 1978 and centers on the use and importance
of carrier forces in a modern navy. The articles are written
by Vice Admiral K. Stalbo , who is closely associated with
Admiral Gorshkov, and Rear Admiral Pushkin, the editor-in-
chief of Morskoy Sbornik
.
Stalbo, who is presumably voicing Gorshkov 's views,
feels that the aircraft carrier will play an important role
in modern military operations. Rear Admiral Pushkin states
that aircraft carriers are too vulnerable to submarines to be
an important part of a modern fleet.
The debate starts with an article in the June, 1978,
issue of Morskoy Sbornik
,
entitled "Aircraft Carriers in the
Postwar Period." The author. Vice Admiral K. Stalbo discusses
the role of the carriers in the United States and NATO
military doctrine with special emphasis on its capability
to deliver nuclear weapons. Stalbo states that carriers
comprise the reserve of strategic nuclear forces in U.S.
doctrine
.
Stalbo aslo states that carriers play an important
role in conventional or local wars. Stalbo states:
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They have become more sophisticated, multifunctional
ships capable o£ accomplishing practically all pri-
mary fleet missions involving the use of general
-
purpose forces [Ref . 30]
.
The article does comment on the carrier's vulneratiil
ity. Stalbo remarks that carriers are very vulnerable to
submarine and air weapons. Submarines and naval air forces
are still a formidable foe for carriers.
Vice Admiral Stalbo concludes his article by
stressing the important role of carriers in the future.
Stalbo writes
:
In view there is no basis to speak of a future reduc-
tion in the importance of carriers in armed conflict
at sea. Moreover, we must speak of an increase in
their role in military operations [Ref. 31].
Several months later Rear Admiral A. Pushkin's
"Combat Operations Against Aircraft Carriers by American and
Japanese Submarines during World War II" was published in
the September, 1979, issue of Morskoy Sbornik . This article
is a detailed discussion of U.S. and Japanese submarine
operations during the second world war.
Rear Admiral Pushkin remarks that Stalbo 's article
overestimated the value of the aircraft carrier. Stalbo was
criticized for not devoting proper attention to the vulner-
ability of aircraft carriers to submarines. It was also
stated that, while effective pressure was being placed on
the enemy by submarines, they (submarines) essentially suf-
fered no losses. Pushkin is stressing that the submarine
is the more capable of the two,
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The article goes into details of carrier surviva-
bility in combat from submarine attacks. It is revealed that
the explosion of even one torpedo would be enough to disable
an aircraft carrier for several months.
Throughout the article. Rear Admiral Pushkin has the
effectiveness of the submarine over the vulnerability of the
aircraft carrier. He concludes by calling the submarine a
"primary attack force in naval warfare," including against
modern carriers.
In January, 1980, the Soviet journal published "The
U.S. Naval Presence and Defending the Interests of the USSR
on the Oceans" by Vice Admiral Stalbo. The article's primary
thrust is the examination of various ways in which the Soviet
Union can protect its interests at sea. However, Stalbo
takes the opportunity to comment on the importance of the
aircraft carrier.
Stalbo remarks that "carrier diplomacy" has been a
constant attribute of imperialist countries since President
Truman. He points out that American naval forces partici-
pated in 177 of 215 conflicts (82%) in the period between
1946 and 1975. Aircraft carriers were used the greatest
number of times (106 instances).
Stalbo emphasizes that aircraft carriers "were and
still are the nucleus" of the naval presence and represent
the principal instrument of American policy. He calls them
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"the most prepared of the front-line forces, the first ones
ready to inflict 'unacceptable losses' on the enemy."
Stalbo is undoubtedly referring to the carrier's nuclear
weapon delivery capability.
In June, 1980, Rear Admiral Pushkin's article,
entitled "German Submarine Operations Against Aircraft
Carriers during World War II," was published. This article
examines the experience of combat employment of submarines
against carriers in the Atlantic. The submarines proved
themselves to be capable of successfully combating carriers.
Pushkin states that without a doubt modern submarines
are a great threat to carriers. He goes on to note that a
carrier with escort forces will not be an easy target. But
war experience indicates that skilled operations by submarines
led to the destruction of carriers even when they had a heavy
escort. In this article, Pushkin stresses the vulnerability
of the carrier to contemporary nuclear-powered submarines.
Appearing in the October, 1982, issue of Morskoy
Sbornik is another article by Pushkin, entitled "Combat
Operations of German Submarines on Sea Lanes off the East
Coast of America in 1942." This article examines the use of
German submarines in the conduct of special operations along
the U.S. East Coast.
Unlike the previous article, in this one Pushkin does
not comment on the vulnerability of carriers. Instead he
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concentrates on relating the effectiveness of submarines.
Pushkin not only gives accounts of the effectiveness of
German submarines but also comments on modern submarines.
The author points out that modern nuclear-powered
submarines' potential to disrupt shipping has increased
immeasurably and that an effective capability to combat
nuclear powered submarines is a long way from becoming a
reality.
Stalbo is trying to present a convincing argument
that aircraft carriers can and will play an important role
in modern naval warfare. It seems likely that Admiral
Gorshkov, with whom Stalbo is closely related, wants to
increase the role of the carrier in the Soviet Navy. Should
Stalbo 's argument win, the Soviet Navy will probably see
more KIEV class vessels and eventually a large-deck (U.S.
style) carrier.
However, if Pushkin wins the debate, resources will
be allocated to submarine forces. Even if Pushkin should
lose, it is inconceivable that submarines will not continue
to play an important role in the Soviet Navy. Soviet SSBN's
are considered a strategic nuclear reserve, a vital part of
the Soviet warfighting concept; and SSN's are used in direct
support of SSBN's
.
In both examples presented, a unity of views is
goal sought. The Soviet leadership must ensure the validity
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o£ any doctrine before adopting it. Experts are given the
opportunity to openly discuss the issues in order to resolve
all of the associated problems. Once this is completed, a
unity of views and doctrine can be established.
C. DISSEMINATION OF USEFUL INFORMATION
A third function of Morskoy Sbornik is the dissemination
of useful information that will assist Soviet seamen in the
performance of their duties. Because of the significantly
increased complexity of equipment, armaments and tactics,
Soviet navymen require a high level of technical knowledge to
maintain combat readiness.
Fleet Admiral N. Sergeyev noted that Morskoy Sbornik
aids officers and readers to utilize the experience of the
best so that they themselves acquire skills more quickly.
Admiral Sergeyev wrote this when he was Chief of Staff of
the Soviet Navy for the March, 1973, Morskoy Sbornik in an
article entitled "Friend and Advisor of the Naval Officer."
In the same article. Admiral Sergeyev comjnented that the
Soviet Navy has become a nuclear-powered and missile-carrying
navy and has emerged into the world oceans. Also, he noted
that shipboard officers, the magazine's main readers, are
carrying out important missions on long cruises. Therefore,
Morskoy Sbornik must aid these officers to become enlightened
naval officers more rapidly.
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A large amount of reference information is published in
the journal. One example of this type of information is the
"Changes in Maritime Law" articles that are published. As
various countries around the world change the limits on
their territorial and economic zone, the magazine informs its
readers of these changes. This information is of obvious
importance for navigation, especially in such relatively
restricted waters as the Baltic Sea. Five of these articles
appeared in Morskoy Sbornik between January and October of
1982.
There are also regular articles entitled "Test Your
Knowledge of Rules for Prevention of Collisions at Sea."
This series appeared at the request of the readers in a
question and answer form. The purpose of these articles is
to assist officers of naval ships who are standing underway
watch on the bridge to assimilate better and reinforce
knowledge of the International Rules for the Prevention of
Collisions at Sea and to ensure that they are understood and
applied at sea.
Under the category of "Ordnance and Technology" are many
axticles of practical use to the technical specialists.
The officers of the engineering departments are reported to
frequently refer to material published in this section.
Published are articles such as "Charging a Lead-Acid Storage
Battery by the Optimum-Voltage Method" by B. Romanenko and
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"Peculiarities of Operating Helicopters in the Summer"
by 0. Savchuk.
These articles are very technical and provide detailed
information. Information on United States and western
weapon systems are also published under this category as
well as under "Foreign Navies." There is a great deal of
focus on U.S. systems and the degree of detail is high.
"Attention: Tomahawk!" by Captain 1st Rank B. Rodianov
and Senior Lieutenant Engineer N. Novichkev, published in
May, 1980, is a good example. This article gives detailed
information on its navigation equipment, flight profile,
employment tactics and different launch versions of the
Tomahawk cruise missile.
Articles on many other topics are also published. These
include subjects such as navigation, tactics of foreign
navies, training methods, etc. Anything that is deemed
useful to the officers and men of the Soviet Navy is liable
to be published. Because of the large number of "informa-
tive" articles published in Morskoy Sbornik
,
the Soviet Navy
must feel this is an effective approach to disseminating
information.
From an editorial which was published in the magazine in
February, 1971, entitled "About the Journal Morskoy Sbornik ,"
a great deal of insight can be gained concerning the effec-
tiveness of the journal. It was noted that the activities
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o£ the magazine were thoroughly analyzed and ways to improve
its contents were pointed out by Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union S. G, Gorshkov and Admiral V. M. Grishanov,
Chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy and member
of the Military Council.
The Military Council of the Navy recommended to the Fleet
Councils that they periodically review the question of using
materials from the journal to solve problems in combat and
political training, in increasing combat readiness, and in
the political education of naval personnel.
The Military Council also recommended that commanders
continually show concern for the dissemination and distri-
bution of the magazine and that they explain to officers
that the journal is a vital means for imparting their politi-
cal, military, and specialized knowledge, and for broadening
their operational -tactical views.
In June, 1980, Morskoy Sbornik was awarded the Order of
the Red Star by L. Brezhnev, Chairmen of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet. The citation read:
For services rendered in communist and military
indoctrination of Soviet navymen and mobilizing them
for successful performance of their missions in defense
of our socialist Homeland, the journal Morskoy Sbornik
is awarded the Order of the Red Star [ReT'. 32] .
Great efforts are being made to make Morskoy Sbornik an
effective organ of the Soviet Navy and CPSU. Admiral Gorshkov
has personally taken an interest in its performance. The
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fact that the journal has been awarded the Order o£ the Red
Star is proof that these efforts are paying off.
52

IV. COMPARISON AND CONTRAST WITH
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
The comparison of Morskoy Sbornik to the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings will enable the reader to gain some
insight into professional naval journals. Sometimes there
is a tendency to isolate a subject that is being examined
to get at all the details. This is only normal and, in many
cases, very necessary. However, in order to gain the proper
perspective in this examination of Morskoy Sbornik
,
it is
necessary to compare and contrast it with another journal.
And what better journal to use for the purpose than U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings ?
A. SIMILARITIES
Both journals were found in the 1800 's by groups of
distinguished and respected naval officers. Morskoy Sbornik
was founded by a group of leading Russian naval officers,
led by Vice Admiral F. Litke. Vice Admiral Litke was a
well known scientist and navigator of his day. The objective
of the journal was the dissemination of useful information
to the fleet.
An article in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in October,
1973 (100th anniversary issue) by Captain Roy C. Smith, USN,





states that on 9 October 1873, there was a meeting of 15
officers at the U. S. Naval Academy, Superintendent, Rear
Admiral John L. Warden presided. There is no record of whose
idea it was to hold the meeting. However, best indications
are that the idea came from Commodore Foxhall Parker. The
new organization's objective was "the advancement of profes-
sional and scientific knowledge in the Navy."
Each journal's readership extends to those who have an
interest in naval and maritime affairs (not only officers)
and each has a foreign readership. The Soviet Morskoy
Sbornik has been available to Western subscribers since 1963
and has a readership in over 70 countries
.
The U.S. Naval Institute has a membership of 65,000.
Over 20,000 are regular members and the remainder are asso-
ciate members. Regular members are regular officers of the
U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Associate members
are others who are interested in the naval and maritime
services. Today the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings has
a readership in 80 countries.
Both professional journals publish articles by junior
as well as senior naval officers although articles by junior
officers are much less frequent in Morskoy Sbornik than in
Proceedings . Articles by civilian specialists are also found
in both publications. The June, 1982, issue of Morskoy
Sbornik had no articles authorized by junior officers. The
same issue had three articles written by civilian specialists
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and three articles by flag level officers. Morskoy Sbornik,
unlike Proceedings
,
publishes many articles by flag level
officers
.
The June, 1982, issue of Proceedings published six articles
by junior officers and five by civilian specialists. This
issue of Proceedings also carried an article by Admiral
Thomas B. Hayward, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, entitled
"Thank God for Sitting Ducks." Articles by flag level officers,
especially the Chief of Naval Operations are infrequent in
Proceedings
.
The substantial articles published in both journals are
usually very well researched and written. They are timely
pieces which are thought -provoking and truly committed to the
advancement of professional and scientific knowledge in the
maritime and naval fields. The July, 1982, issue of Morskoy
Sbornik published an article entitled "Aviation Against Ships
(Comments on the Anglo -Argentine Conflict)." The article
began by calling it a conflict between an "imperialist
predator" who would prefer to see the world in its past
colonial aspect and a "nonaligned country."
2A brief history of the Malvinas (called the Falkland
Islands in England) is discussed, beginning with its discovery
2
It is noteworthy that the Soviets refer to the islands
as the Malvinas, the name that Argentina uses.
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in 1520. It states that the British "seized" the islands
in 1833 and that Argentina announces its protest each
year since the event. The article also notes that the
British refuse to undertake peaceful negotiations on the
matter
.
Also included is the composition of the forces of the
two sides and an account of the combat operations. This
piece was timely in that the Argentine Falkland garrison
surrendered on 15 June 1982 and the article was published
7 July 1982.
According to an editorial in Morskoy Sbornik (February,
1971) , the magazine should expose the aggressive nature of
Western navies and their role in "predatory wars;" there-
fore, most writings about foreign wars in the Soviet journal
inject a class struggle aspect into it. These articles also
analyze the combat operations conducted in an attempt to
learn from others.
Proceedings in their September, 1982, issue published
three articles concerning the British-Argentine conflict
over the Falklands . Two of the articles, "Maneuver Warfare
at Sea" and "Maneuvering in the Falklands," both by Commander
Robert J. Kelsey, USN, discussed the maneuver-oriented
strategy that Great Britain used and its place in the U.S.




The third article, entitled "The Falklands Conflict"
3
by Sir James Cable , examines the reasons the British fought
for the Falkland Islands. This is a very informative piece
which discusses future NATO and international implications
of British actions.
All three of the articles were thought-provoking pieces
which gave the reader insight into several aspects of the
British-Argentine conflict in a timely manner. These articles
are indicative of the quality and timeliness of materials
published in both journals.
B. DIFFERENCES
More important and noteworthy than the similarities
between Morskoy Sbornik and the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings are the differences. First, the U.S. Naval
Institute is a private organization for those interested
in naval and maritime affairs. It is not a part of the
U.S. Navy Department and is a self-supporting, non-profit
organization. Every edition of Proceedings has the following
statement printed just below the table of contents:
The opinions or assertions in the articles are the per-
sonal ones of the authors and are not to be construed
as official. They do not necessarily reflect the views
of either the Navy Department or the U.S. Naval Institute.
3Sir James Cable is a retired British Ambassador, who




Morskoy Sbornik is an official organ of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet Navy. The
Naval General Staff was given control of Morskoy Sbornik
on 29 November 1917; thus, the Communist Party put the maga-
zine at the services of the Soviet Fleet.
According to Vice Admiral Shchedrin, Morskoy Sbornik is
provided with a great deal of assistance by the General
Staff and the Central Political Administration of the Soviet
Navy. The magazine's activities are directed by the Navy
Military Council. The council receives reports by the editor
in-chief, assigns specific tasks and indicates ways in which
they can be accomplished. The editorial staff is required
to rigidly follow the policy of the Central Committee of the
CPSU and the Soviet Government in all matters, especially
with respect to developing the fleet and raising combat
readiness; to propagate Marxist-Leninist theory and the
decisions of CPSU Congresses and Plenums of the Party's
Central Committee; and to instill in officers good moral
-
political qualities.
Morskoy Sbornik publishes many articles which are based
on materials from the foreign press; this is not seen very
often in the U.S. publications. This is most likely due to
our different views with regard to freedom of information
and freedom of the press. Because information is more avail-
able in the West, it affords greater opportunity for the
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Soviet than for the U.S. writer to use foreign press material
in his research. Most of the articles published in Morskoy
Sbornik are noted with a subtitle stating that they are
based on material from the foreign press. It is assumed that
the entire article is based on foreign press materials, even
though the publications are rarely cited. Some articles
which are obviously based on the foreign press are not labeled
as such.
Morskoy Sbornik published an article in March, 1982,
entitled "NATO's Plans for Maritime Transport," by Captain
1st Rank Yu. Bol'shakov, Ya. Borisov, and V. Vektorov. The
following is an excerpt from this article which was based on
foreign press material:
In the situation of ever-growing anti-Soviet hysteria
and aggressiveness on the part of the United States and
some of its NATO allies the Western press has begun
giving greater attention to the problems of preparing
the transport fleet for war and defense of sea lanes.
A survey of some material on this subject is offered
to the reader in the article below [Ref. 33].
An earlier article (December, 1981) published in the
Soviet journal, entitled "Anti Detente Policy," by Captain
2nd Rank N. Kabalin, was also based on foreign press materials
The author indicated in the article that material was based
on the foreign press as in this example:
Judging by reports in the foreign press, during the
operational training of the NATO navies, attention
was focused on work on the following missions
:
switching naval forces from a peacetime to a wartime
footing in case of a worsening of the international
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situation; reinforcing the forward groupings of armed
forces on the NATO flanks; the formation and use of
multi-national units of naval forces for operations
under exceptional circumstances; cooperation with
other branches of the national armed forces and the
bloc as a whole .... [Ref. 34].
Directly related to the extensive use of foreign press
materials by the Soviets is the relatively large number of
articles describing foreign (especially U.S.) weapon systems
It is amazing how much information can be collected on U.S.
weapon systems from open sources. For example, in Morskoy
Sbornik
,
No. 8, 1980, an article entitled "The U.S. Navy's
Hornet" contains detailed information on design features,
power plant, armament and on-board electronic equipment of
the aircraft.
The following basic design data was published:
Basic design data: Weight of empty aircraft-
-9 ,340
kg; take-off weight--15 ,260 - 22,700 kg (depending
on variant of use); maximum speed at high altitude-
-
1,900 km/hr; combat radius with four missiles and
fuel reserve in internal tanks- -740 km; combat
ceiling--15 ,00 m; wing span--11.4 m (7.6 with folded
panels); wing area--58.5 m2 ; length--17 m; height--
4.5 m. The aircraft is developed by McDonnell
Douglas (prime contractor) and Northrop (subcon-
tractor). Plans for its production have not yet been
determined once and for all. It was initially planned
to make 800 series produced aircraft and 11 test
models .... [Ref. 35]
.
Another such article was published in June, 1982, by
Morskoy Sbornik . "The Shipboard Radars of the British Navy"
by Captain 3rd Rank B. Azarov provides detailed data on
many British radar systems. The author does note that his
article is based on material from the foreign press. The
60

following excerpt is used to describe the SAPPHIRE fire control
system employed by the British:
Jamproofing of the radar involves the use of a mono-
pulse method of direction-finding and of digital
selection of moving targets, and the resetting of
working frequency from impulse to impulse (automatic
and manual regimes) ; tracking in passive regime the
target source of jamming; changing pulse repetition
frequency and duration; and combining a V0051 -system
television camera with the antenna device. Utiliza-
tion of the super-high-frequency range, pulses of
short duration and the monopause method of direction-
finding makes it possible to achieve fairly high
accuracy in tracking an aerial target; 1.0 - 1.7
minutes for angular coordinates and 1-3 meters for
range. Blind area tracking regime is 350 meters
[Ref. 36].
The Soviets can get this type of detailed information
because of Western views in regard to freedom of the press
and freedom of information. A Soviet researcher can collect
detailed technical data from Western open source publications.
Sometimes material published in the open source publications
is classified. Therefore, it is very easy for the Soviets
to collect large amounts of important information from the
West.
It is very fare for the Soviets to discuss their own
weapon systems because of their tight security. And it is
also unusual for Proceedings to publish a detailed article on
Soviet weapon system. This is because U.S. authors cannot
gather that type of information from open sources in the
Soviet Union.
However, other articles of a non-technical and unclassi-
fied nature are sometimes found in the pages of Proceedings.
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A good example of this is the October, 1982, Soviet xNavy
issue of Proceedings . The entire issue is dedicated to
discussion and examination of many facets of the Soviet Navy.
Many articles in this issue use materials drawn from Soviet
open sources.
One example is an article entitled "Their Missions and
Tactics" by Norman Polmar with Norman Friedman. This article
discusses what the authors refer to as "profound differences
between Soviet and Western naval 'style.'"
The authors draw material from several works of Admiral
Gorshkov to show why the Soviet Navy has rejected the theories
of Mahan which form the basis of U.S. Naval thought.
From Gorshkov 's "Red Star Rising at Sea," the authors
draw on his conclusions of German U-boat operations during
World War II. Polmar and Friedman also quote from this
writing to give reasons for the Soviet rejection of Mahan
theories
.
Later, an excerpt is used from Gorshkov 's "The Sea Power
of the State" to provide a Soviet view of forward operations
in peacetime. The authors also use an article written by
Admiral Gorshkov entitled "Naval Cruises Play Rone in Training,
International Relations" (Bloknot Agitatora , No. 8, April,
1973) to give the Soviet view of using sailors as ambassadors
to other countries.
An article entitled "Concerning Some Trends in the
Development of Naval Tactics" by Captain 1st Rank N. Vo'yunenko
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CMorskoy Sbornik , October 1975) is used to describe Soviet
interest in helicopter ASW operations. The authors use a
quote from the article to help make their point.
A piece entitled "Their SSGs/SSGNs" by Milan Vego
(Proceedings , October, 1982) is another example of using
foreign press sources. In this article Vego examines the
SSG/SSGN threat to the U.S. Navy and, in doing so, draws
from several Soviet open sources.
To list target priorities for SSG ' s/SSGN ' s , Vego draws
from "Naval Intelligence Targets and Forces" by Captain 1st
Rank K. Titov. This article was published by Morskoy Sbornik
in September, 1972. These target priorities are listed by
combat operational targets and targets for anti-SLOC missions.
Captain 1st Rank B. Kostev's "Coordination-- the Most
Important Principle in the Employment of Forces" (Morskoy
Sbornik
,
February, 1974) was used to describe close cooperation
between attacking units. Kostev stated that cooperation had
two objectives: first, to prevent mutual interference, and
second, to achieve an effective strike.
In stressing the importance the Soviets place on coordi-
nating the use of weapons, the author uses a quote from
Gorshkov's "Navies in War and in Peace," Morskoy Sbornik
,
February 1973.
Admittedly, entire issues of Proceedings devoted to the
Soviet Union are rare. However, individual articles on
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specific topics of the Soviet Navy based on Soviet open
sources are published occasionally in the journal.
Another interesting difference to note is the role of
ideology. Ideology plays a very important role in Soviet
society; therefore, it is not surprising that Marxist-
Leninist ideology is also vital in the publication of
Morskoy Sbomik
.
Marxist-Leninist ideology is a comprehensive, consistent,
and coherent basis for which Soviet authors draw their views.
The Communist Party establishes the "correct" point of view
on any subject and it is required that it be complied with and
disseminated. All Soviet military writings must be ideologi-
cally correct.
Morskoy Sbornik published an article in July, 1982,
entitled "Methodological Problems of the Theory of Building
a Navy and Employing it in Battle" by Rear Admiral V. Gulin
and Captain 1st Rank Yu. Borisov. This piece emphasizes
the importance of establishing the proper view when examining
any subject. The authors state that an expert in any field
must approach a particular problem from the standpoint of
his general ideas about the world and social processes.
Gulin and Borisov go on to say:
As for military affairs and a constituent part of it
such as building the navy and employing it in battle,
in our day these matters are closely tied to all aspects
of social life and determined by them. Therefore, a
comprehensive study of them must be done from the
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standpoint of the different fields of knowledge, above
all from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism as a scien-
tific world view and methodology [Ref. 37].
Gulin and Borison are saying that a Marxist-Leninist
philosophy is a universal methodology. This Marxist-Leninist
philosophy provides the framework for methodological princi-
ples related to acquiring knowledge about all aspects of
activity, including military affairs. It is therefore
important that all military theory and problems be worked
out within the framework of a Marxist-Leninist methodology.
How does this relate to naval theory? According to
Soviet writings, each branch of the armed forces is capable
of bringing force to bear on land, sea and air. Because
victory is achieved by coordinated efforts, it is necessary
to integrate all knowledge about warfare within the limits
of a unified military science.
Since each branch of the armed forces has specific in-
herent features, it must be studied differently by each of
the corresponding branches. However, it must be stressed
that they fall within the framework of military science.
Above all, providing the basis for all theoretical research
is the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. That is all social
life, including war must be evaluated from the social class
aspect. War is an extension of politics and the signifi-
cance of Western and Soviet policy must not be overlooked.
To ensure that the correct point of view is present, each
publication must be approved by the Main Political
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Administration. This was pointed out by the editors of the
magazine in an article entitled "About the Journal Morskoy
Sbornik " (February, 1971, p. 34).
The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union are required to carry
out a great deal of ideological training.
The Military Council of the Navy has obliged
Morskoy Sbornik to elucidate in depth for Naval
personnel the concepts of Marxism-Leninism and the
policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet
Government [Ref. 12].
Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain 2nd Rank I. Povalyayev
wrote "Two Approaches to One Subject," which was published
by Morskoy Sbornik in November, 1979. The authors emphasize
the intensification of the class struggle between socialism
and capitalism.
Gulin and Povalyayev state that the ideological struggle
is becoming the most urgent under the conditions of peaceful
coexistence. This is a time of bitterness and exacerbation
of that struggle, in which the historical offensive belongs
to socialism. Imperialism is mounting ideological counter-
attacks in an attempt to recover its losses.
The Soviets seem to think that the struggle for ideas
is most important and they cannot ease their efforts in com-
bating the capitalists in this struggle.
Another peculiar divergence of Morskoy Sbornik from the
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings is the importance which is
placed on historical analysis. Each edition has an entire
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section with several articles entitled "The Pages of History."
Examination of historical events is also published in the
"Naval Art" section of the magazine. These articles usually
provide an analysis of a past campaign, battle or operation;
usually cited are examples from World War II.
This focus on historical analysis has deep ideological
roots. Not only must the articles have the proper ideologi-
cal basis but the methodology the magazine uses to accomplish
its tasks must be ideologically "correct."
The founders of Marxism thoroughly revealed the
importance of a historical approach to an analysis
of modern social phenomena and prospects for their
development [Ref. 38].
It is believed that the study of past combat actions can
be of tremendous benefit to the Soviet Navy. For example,
the following statement was made with regard to amphibious
operations
:
The experience of amphibious actions gained by the
Navy in the war years is of enormous importance for the
development of naval art under present-day conditions
[Ref. 14].
"The Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War" by
Admiral V. Sysoyev was published in Morskoy Sbornik in March,
1979. This is a good example of studying past combat actions
to develop naval strategy. The article discusses joint
operations, defense of naval bases, amphibious landings and




The wealth of combat experience acquired in the Great
Patriotic War and the rapid postwar development of the
material means of waging warfare at sea have become the
foundation of further development of naval strategy
[Ref. 39].
There is another type of historical article found in
Morskoy Sbornik
. These articles are accounts of brave and
heroic deeds of the Soviet fighting man in battle.
It is imperative to broadly propagandize the revo-
lutionary and battle traditions of the Communist Party
and Soviet people, the heroism displayed by navy men
during the Great October Socialist Revolution and the
Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, and the glorious history
of our country's navy [Ref. 40].
An example of this type of article was written by Captain
1st Rank A. Mel 'chin, entitled "Following a Heading of
Courage," and appeared in the January, 1980, issue of Morskoy
Sbornik . This is a chronicle of the men of the Pacific fleet
Mel 'chin refers to them as legendary and states that the
Soviet people should take pride in them. Its predecessors,
the Okhatsk and subsequently the Siberian flotillas, added
several vivid pages to the history of the Soviet Union.
A second example is an article which appeared in the May,
1980, issue of the journal. The article, entitled "They
Served in Battle for the Homeland," was written by the
editorial staff. It is an account of the 1st Guarts Division
of small subclasses of the Baltic fleet. This unit was




"The People Are Proud of You.
. ."by Rear Admiral
V. Ruthovskiy appeared in the same May, 1980, issue. In
this piece Ruthkovskiy reminisces about the legendary Soviet
military leader seaman, Mikhaylovich Budenny. Despite the
passage of nearly 40 years since the end of World War II,
he is still revered by the fighting men of the Soviet armed
forces
.
These articles are intended to instill in navy men a
devotion to the Communist Party and Soviet people and a
commitment to fight for the Socialist cause.
Another difference between the two journals is that one
sees less open disagreements about naval theory of military
procedures in Morskoy Sbornik . This is because the magazine
is an official press organ of the Soviet Navy and, as such,
publishes only articles which are in line with official
policy decisions. However, when a policy has not yet been
decided upon by the Central Committee of the CPSU , Morskoy
Sbornik is used as a forum for discussion and debate.
The establishment and development of any science or
theory entails, as a rule, sharp debate and the over-
coming of difficulties, both objective and subjective.
This is quite normal, and it applies in full measure
to the system of knowledge about the Navy, since the
latter 's development and refinement is a continuing
process, one which, moreover, is sometimes controver-
sial, for a number of political, economic and other
reasons [Ref . 41]
.
These discussions are used to work out problems and to
bring about a united view on a subject in order that a policy
or doctrine be established.
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Sharp disagreements are rare, but not unknown, in the
pages of Morskoy Sbornik . Discussed earlier in this piece
is an intense ongoing debate of an article written by Vice
Admiral K. Stalbo entitled "Some Issues of the Theory of the
Development and Employment of the Navy." Stalbo wrote the
article because he thinks there is an urgent need for a
systematic examination of the primary elements of the theory
His article touched off critical responses from other senior
Soviet naval officers.
Vice Admiral Stalbo 's article has been attacked by many
well known senior Soviet naval officers who have found
several shortcomings in it. The three basic areas in which
Stalbo is criticized are ideological, theoretical and
operational
.
Admiral V. N. Chernavin stated in his article (Morskoy
Sbornik
,
January, 1982), which criticized Stalbo's theory,
that this debate should continue. He further states that
its continuation will serve to find solutions to theoretical
problems of Naval theory.
According to Dr. Sugg' article, "The Soviet Navy:
Changing of the Guard?" (Proceedings, April, 1983), this
debate may indicate that Admiral Gorshkov is in some politi-
cal trouble. Suggs points out that Stalbo has always been
very closely associated with Gorskhov and appears to be
speaking for him in this case.
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Suggs remarks that the debate has all the signs of careful
planning
,
coordination and approval. Because of Stalbo's
connection with Gorskhov and the intensity of the criticism,
Suggs believes that the attack (presumably on Gorshkov) was
originated outside the Soviet Navy at a high level within
the Party.
Suggs concludes that the debate provides a forum for
discussion of important issues and it exerts pressure on
Gorshkov. It may be related to widespread changes in the
Soviet military and political hierarchy initiated during
Brezhnev's final months, possibly by the Andropov faction.
Another peculiarity, which is sometimes shocking to the
unattuned, is Morskoy Sbornik 's aggressive attacks on the
opinions and principles of the Western nations. The use of
polemics and strong language is not something new in Soviet
writings
.
We devote a great deal of time to cultivation of
hatred in navy personnel against enemies of socialism
and communism, i.e., against, the imperialist aggressors
[Ref. 42].
In a recent article, it was stated that:
Morskoy Sbornik . . . lays bare the reactionary
essence o± bourgeois ideology, and teaches a class
hatred toward the enemy of peace- -the imperialist
[Ref. 43].
For example, "imperialists" are said to be inculcated
with "rabid anticommunism" and "bestial hatred" for socialism.
And the "adventuristic bourgeois navies'" indoctrination
is based on "antihumanism."
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Vice Admiral A. Gontayet wrote:
The military doctrines of capitalistic states, where
private ownership relationships dominate and a dictator-
ship of the bourgeoisie is exercised, reflect an attempt
to perpetuate the dominance of exploiting classes within
their own countries, to eliminate or weaken the world
system of socialism, and to enslave other states
economically and politically [Ref. 44].
These are only a few examples of polemics which occur in
the pages of Morskoy Sbornik.
Another distinction between Morskoy Sbornik and the U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings is that it is not uncommon for
the Soviets to publicly repreiand or embarrass individuals
who have failed in their duties. This practice is common
in both military and civil publications in the Soviet Union.
The following is an example:
. . . Last year, for example, there was a decline in the
state of military discipline in the subunit where Captain
3rd Rank B. Zabelin is the secretary of the party organi-
zation. Among the violators were even some communists
[Ref. 45].
The Soviets also use their journal to publicly recognize
good work
:
. . . Nikolayev, for example, besides conducting dis-
cussions and delivering lectures, headed the council
on military-technical propaganda. The personnel love
to meet with him and listen to his speeches [Ref. 46].
Morskoy Sbornik and Proceedings are both fine professional
naval journals. Each has a large international readerhip
which is interested in naval and maritime subjects. Both
journals contain writings by junior as well as senior officers
and civilian specialists; it is noteworthy that many articles
in Morskoy Sbornik are written by flag level naval officers.
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The differences between the two magazines are a result of
Morskoy Sbornik being an official organ of the state and
Proceedings being a private organization. Because of this
Morskoy Sbornik must publish articles which are ideologically
correct and best serve the needs of the Soviet Navy and the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. To ensure that the
articles are ideologically correct, they must be approved
Ccensored) by the Main Political Administration.
Because Morskoy Sbornik is an official publication, it
serves the Soviet Navy and the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. All of the theoretical discussions fall within the
framework of Marxist-Leninist methodology. That is, a social
class point of view is taken. Provided the various peculiari-





V. VARIOUS SOVIET PERCEPTIONS
Morskoy Sbornik contains a great deal of useful informa-
tion concerning Soviet views on various subjects. As discussed
earlier, the journal has three primary missions: to foster
a unity of views, to serve as a forum for discussion and
debate, and to disseminate useful information.
By keeping these missions in mind, nothing the authorship,
the number of articles on a topic, the intensity of its tone,
and the phrases used, it is possible to glean Soviet thought
on a particular subject. This must also be combined with a
basic knowledge of history, political culture and ideology.
In this section, three topics of interest will be examined
in an attempt to uncover Soviet perceptions on these subjects.
The three subjects are: the maritime threat, command and
control, and the commanding officer.
A. MARITIME THREAT
Morskoy Sbornik publishes many articles which refer to
the military threat posed to the Soviet Union by the United
States and its allies. These articles fall into two cate-
gories. The first type is primarily critical of the aggres-
sive intentions of the West, led by the United States. They
portray the United States and its allies, especially the NATO
allies, as being very aggressive and preparing for war
against the Soviet Union. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet
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Union S. Gorshkov wrote in January, 1981, that:
The growth and combat -readiness of our navy are a
warning to those militaristic circles of imperialism
which continue to oppose the lessening of tension in
the world, intensify the arms race, make preparations
for war, and create more and more dangerous flash-
points in various parts of the world [Ref . 47]
.
Another article appearing in April, 1982, written by Rear
Admiral B. Yashin, states:
Thus, the realization of plans for strengthening
the overall might of the U.S. Navy and the adoption
of the "Reagan Navy" program represent a new, danger-
ous and unwarranted stage of the naval weapons race
that has been unleashed by the United States on an
unprecedented scale [Ref. 48]
.
The magazine also attacks the "myth" of the Soviet threat
to the West. Rear Admiral B. Yashin writes:
Even a cursory examination of the American press
confirms that the departments of the Army and Navy are
trying to broaden the completely unjustified military
preparations to the accompaniment of ill-intentioned
fabrications about the "Soviet Threat." It has come
down to where they are trying to justify preparations
for an allegedly "regulatable limited nuclear war which
can be controlled," and are amusing themselves with the
hope of "disarming" the USSR with the very first strike
[Ref. 49].
Morskoy Sbomik publishes many such articles by senior
naval officers which are completely devoted to attacking
Western aggressive intentions and actions. The articles all
use the same or similar phrases and, in many cases, use
polemics. The emotional intensity of these articles seems
to be high and they have been especially intense since
President Reagan assumed office. In February, 1982, Morskoy
Sbornik published an editorial which stated:
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But lately the intensity of the world situation is
becoming more and more dangerous. The threat o£
nuclear war hovers over the entire planet today.
Direct responsibility for the situation at hand
is borne above all by the United States of America.
With the arrival of President Reagan to power, . . .
with their very first statements and practical steps
the heads of the new U.S. -overnment seemingly set the
goal not of correcting, but multiplying the mistakes
of the previous administration and contributing not to
a relaxation of international tension, but to its
intensification [Ref. 50].
These kinds of articles are considered a very important
part in the ideological struggle between capitalism and
socialism. The West, led by the United States, is trying
to distort the essence and social purpose of the military
power of the Soviet Union. This requires great effort by
the Soviets to criticize imperialist military doctrine.
Aside from being obliged by ideology, these articles
reflect a concern by the Soviets of the recent large military
spending and preparations taking place in the West. Since
President Reagan's arrival in office, not only has there been
a greater emphasis on the armed forces in the United States
and its allies, but the U.S. government has taken a "hard
line" foreign policy stand with the Soviet Union. This does
seem to be of concern to the Soviets.
From the same February, 1982, editorial referred to
earlier the Soviets state that, with the arrival of President
Reagan to power, the United States foreign policy has been
characterized as "hard line." The piece quotes Weinberger
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as saying that President Reagan's administration is striving
"to revive America's past might and rearm it so that the
United States can hold talks from a position of strength."
The second type of article primarily addresses naval
capabilities of the United States and its allies. This
type of article usually presents analyses or descriptions
of ships, aircraft, weapons, sensors, support facilities
and tactics. Some get straight to the point, but most have
to get in at least one aggressive criticism toward the West.
From these articles, it is possible to gain valuable
insight as to which weapon system(s) the Soviets perceive
as the greatest threat to their security. Detailed discus-
sions of certain topics keep reappearing in the pages of
Morskoy Sbornik ; one must conclude that these are of great
interest to the Soviets. The topics stressed over the past
few years are: the Trident system, Tomahawk cruise missiles,
and anti-submarine warfare forces.
An article written by Captains 1st Rank G. Luk'yanov
and M. Sdov'yev in March, 1981, entitled "The Atlantic and
NATO," discusses all three of the topics cited above. All
three are discussed in the context of the United States and
NATO's dangerous policy of building up the arms race.
First it was noted that a decision to deploy 464 cruise
missiles (Tomahawk) and an additional 108 Pershing-2 missiles
would be implemented. This would be the beginning of a new
concept in Western European defense.
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Mentioned next was the Trident program. The Soviets
call it an important new program that will increase the combat
potential of nuclear powered missile-carrying submarines.
It is noted that thirteen submarines have been authorized
and eight are now being built. There will be a follow-on
Trident II missile in production later.
The SOSUS submarine detection system is also discussed.
The system is employed in strategic areas where it is likely
to detect Soviet submarines. SOSUS is constantly being
improved and subsystems are being developed to complement it.
A second article by Major Boytsov in April, 1981, states
that the Pentagon is placing reliance on creating a potential
for a "disarming first strike" by increasing accuracy and
yield of nuclear weapons.
Major Boytsov accused the United States of increasing
the nuclear arms race by already planning to refit the Ohio
class SSBN with the more accurate Trident-2 ballistic missile
after stepping up the rate of construction. Boytsov also
notes that the U.S. will have up to 250 B-1 strategic bombers
and 150 B-52 strategic bombers with 3,000 cruise missiles
(Tomahawk) by the early 1990 's.
One of the most unusual series of articles to appear in
Morskoy Sbornik is entitled "The U.S. Navy by the Year 2000."
This two-part series appeared in the June and July issues of
1981. This series deserves special attention because it is
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the first article in the magazine attempting to predict the
state of development of the U.S. Navy in the long term. One
possible reason for the series is the growing emphasis by the
Soviets on forecasting in decision-making and for increased
lead time for program planning.
The authors (editorial staff) wrote that the United
States stressed preemptive strikes and counterforce capability
as a fundamental principle. They identify three major areas
of "U.S. deterrence," the Trident system first. Tomahawk
cruise missile second, and the antisubmarine warfare forces
third.
To assure a "strategy of deterrence" (or restraint")
stress is placed on carrying out the Trident program as
soon as possible and fully; on providing a so-called
"counter-force" struggle, and on raising the accuracy
of missle-warhead guidance. The Americans consider the
Tomahawk cruise missile the second and no less important
component of "deterrence." It is planned to equip no
less than 60 submarines and approximately 100 surface
ships of various classes with them.
The men and resources of "ASW" are considered the
third element of "restraint" in the USA. Ever increas-
ing importance is attached to its development [Ref. 51].
It is easy to see the high interest the Soviets show in
Trident, Tomahawk and antisubmarine warfare forces.
"The Reaganavy" or "The Three -Ocean Navy," written by
Rear Admiral B. Yashin (Reserves), appeared in April, 1982.
It also paid particular to Trident, Tomahawk and antisub-
marine warfare forces. There was much space allocated to
discuss these subjects. In reference to the Trident system,
Rear Admiral Yashin stated:
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Further strengthening of the naval component of the
strategic forces will be accomplished by increasing
the rate of construction of new SSBN's of the Ohio
class with Trident I and II missiles and completing
the retrofitting of 12 Poseidon SSBN's to the Trident I
missile [Ref. 52].




Note must be made of the intensification of attention
to the construction of specialized ships for long-range
sonar surveillance, which are intended to strengthen
task forces of ASW ships and extend the sphere of
effectiveness of the SOSUS system [Ref. 53]
.
Later in the article, when the discussion turns back to
offensive capabilities, the author notes:
To increase its "offensive potential," the Navy
proposes to equip up to 150 combatants, vessels and
submarines with Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles. Some
SSBN's of the GEORGE WASHINGTON class are being con-
verted to cruise missile carriers. It is planned to
put all four battleships of the IOWA class into service
and install missile launchers on each of them for 32
Tomahawk and 16 Harpoon missiles. In all, it is
planned to buy about 4,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles
and bring the total number of launchers for these
missiles up to 2,600 during the 1980's [Ref. 54].
The final example, an article written by Major M. Boytsov
in October, 1982, discusses "NATO Nuclear Weapons in the
Theater of War." In this article, the author illustrates
the significant increase in United States nuclear potentil
in the European theater of military operations. Included
in his list of long-range nuclear weapons is the "Trident-1
ballistic missiles of nuclear-powered submarines."
Boytsov goes on to say that the arsenal of naval nuclear
weapons is most diverse. He lists the ASROC (ASW guided
missiles of surface ships) and SUBROC (ASW guided missiles
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of submarines) as part of the inventory. Later he notes
that the sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles will signifi-
cantly improve the NATO strategic nuclear weapon capability
in the foreseeable future.
The threat articles reviewed in Morskoy Sbornik thus
reflect the Soviet view that the United States Trident
system, Tomahawk cruise missile and antisubmarine warfare
forces are a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.
The articles used as examples were selected because they
are representative of the many articles which discuss these
topics. There are many articles which focus on one topic
alone. Some of these articles are: "TRIDENT Is Being
Improved" by Ye Rankin Which emphasizes technological im-
provements of SLBM's and warns that they are approaching
absolute accuracy; "ATTENTION: TOMAHAWK!" by Captain 1st
Rank B. Rodionov and Senior Lieutenant-Engineer N. Novichkov
describes in detail the technical features and possible
employment tactics; and "Reconnaissance of Nuclear Ballistic-
Missile Submarines" by I. Kuz'mum. This article notes that
the system the United States is establishing to combat
nuclear ballistic-missile submarines has great potential.
The most vaunted characteristic of Trident and Tomahawk
(especially submarine -launched Tomahawk) is its invulnera-
bility. In terms of Western deterrence theory, this provides
an "assured response." However, the implication of
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invulnerability from the Soviet point of view is that these
missiles can be held back from the initial exchange and can
be used at a later stage of the war.
The capacity of sea-based nuclear delivery systems to
survive the initial exchange affects an important aspect of
Soviet military thinking. The requirement for strategic
reserves is essential to the concept of war-fighting with
nuclear weapons. Soviet strategy must assume that the
availability of nuclear weapons be critical at certain
(later) stages in a war. It must also be assumed that sole
possession of a substantial nuclear capability will likely
determine the outcome of the war and the political structure
of the post-war world. Since the United States is signifi-
cantly improving its sea-based systems with Trident and
Tomahawk, the Soviet Union is concerned.
Basically the same logic can be applied to the concern
with U.S. antisubmarine warfare forces. The fact that the
U.S. is emphasizing the improvement of ASW forces is a
direct threat to the Soviet strategic reserve, Soviet SSBN's.
Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that the Soviet
Union would be concerned with recent developments in Trident,
Tomahawk and antisubmarine warfare forces.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE SOVIET NAVY
Command and Control is nothing new in the pages of
Morskoy Sbornik; however, in recent years, it has been
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emphasized in the magazine. The reason for this, as stated
in the articles, is the changing conditions and nature of
modern warfare. The Soviets perceive that modern warfare
will be complicated by its diverse situational variations,
large spatial scope and accelerated tempo. They are also
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of centralized
and decentralized control of forces. They feel that both
have a place in their system of control. The role and
potential of automated control systems are examined; the
Soviets think that automated control systems are necessary
to aid the commanding officer in decision-making under the
conditions of modern warfare.
The recent increase in the number of articles concerning
command and control (including automated control systems)
began in May, 1980, with a two-part series written by Admiral
of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov, entitled
"Problems with Respect to Control of Naval Forces." Admiral
Gorshkov points out that modern day combat operations will
be characterized by the large spatial scope, accelerated
tempo, and diverse variation in the situation during combat
at sea. Commanding officers at all levels will have very
little time to make important decisions.
Because of large tactical fleets, Gorshkov states that
the most important and difficult responsibilities of the
fleet Commander-in-Chief becomes the organization, training
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and conducting of combat operations of the forces under his
command. This, along with the evolution of forces and the
increased number of missions carried out, makes control
very complicated.
In December, 1969, at a meeting of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, Brezhnev said:
Under present conditions, it is getting beyond
the capacity of an experienced and even talented
organizer to lead in the old fashioned way, by rely-
ing only on previous experience and common sense.
Control is being transformed into a science, and
this science must be mastered as quickly and as
thoroughly as possible, and must be studied per-
sistently even by the one who assumes high-level
command and control responsibilities.
Next, the article discussed centralized and decentralized
control. It states that there must be a correlation between
centralized and decentralized control of forces in naval
operations. Centralized control methods have noteworthy
advantages. First, they make it possible to achieve efficient
coordination and support of all the forces employed in the
operation. Second, they have the ability to redirect indi-
vidual units in the presence of a rapidly shifting situation.
Gorshkov also goes on to say that under certain conditions,
superfluous centralization of control can result in an intol-
erable overload on the staff and lowering of the effectiveness
of control. Also, to a certain degree, it can paralyze the
independence and initiative of subordinates. Therefore, the
level of centralization will depend on the situation that has
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developed, and control systems must provide both centralized
and decentralized control of forces.
Later the Admiral makes the point that, because of the
complex nature of the control problem, it requires a complex
systems approach to develop a system for control of forces.
Quality in control today can only be accomplished by the use
of automated control systems. Automated control systems
which use special control software will not only increase
efficiency but will create the possibility of reinforcing
the intellect of the commanding officers at all levels under
everyday and combat situations. Thus in critical conditions,
it will be possible to optimize efforts and increase combat
effectiveness. Automated control equipment is elevated to
a level which is as important as weaponry.
Basically this article is stating that under modern con-
ditions the importance of the control system has sharply
increased and that the primary purpose of an automated
control system is to assist the commanding officer in making
the most expedient decision.
The second part of Gorshkov's article, published in
June, 1980, discusses the dialectics of control categories
in relation to the incorporation of computer technology and
software into the control process.
For the purposes of our discussion, the main point to be
gained from part two of the series is the human element role.
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Admiral Gorshkov emphasizes that control technology and
software are only a means to facilitate the most correct
decision and to develop an operations plan to implement it.
Mathematical models do not give the commanding officer or his
staff a decision or operations plan but only quantitative data
to work out a decision or plan. Thus the decision will
always be subjective for the final decision is the command-
ing officer's, not matter what level of development the
automated control equipment has reached.
Rear Admiral M. Iskanderov wrote a piece called "The
Development of Battle," published in May, 1980. Iskanderov
basically says that because of the great increase in quanti-
tative characteristics of battle, that is, the number of
ships and other forces employed and the scope of time and
area, control becomes increasingly difficult. Like Gorshkov,
he notes that the increase of "spatial scope" causes compli-
cations and that the time factor has acquired new significance
The major conclusion of the article, based on the experi-
ence of past wars, is that under otherwise equal conditions
the side with the best control will win the battle.
Taking the lead from Admiral Gorshkov, an article written
by Captain 1st Rank Ye. Dvoryanov was published in January,
1981. Dvoryanov 's "Some Tendencies in the Development of
Control of Naval Troops and Forces in Amphibious Landing
Operations" begins by commenting that Admiral Gorshkov's
two-part series (May and June, 1981) presented in full
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detail the role and principal lines of development of a
modern system of naval control.
The article is an examination of the devleopment of the
control of naval and ground troops in amphibious operation
during World War II. Two factors which were mentioned by
Admiral Gorshkov were also noted as having their effect on
the development of control of naval troops and forces; these
factors were accelerated time periods in which to conduct
operations and sharply changing situations.
Similar points are made in an article by Admiral V.
Sidorov, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, entitled
"The Staff of a Fleet as an Organ of Control." The article,
published in October, 1981, starts out by pointing out that
the nature and conditions of modern combat are very complex
and control organs are very important.
Sidorov notes, as did Gorshkov, that automation of control
is a very effective means to improve the system. Studies
have shown that only ten percent of available information is
used to work out a combat order without the aid of an auto-
mated control system. This will naturally reflect upon the
effectiveness of the assigned mission.
A second important point made is that the final decision
is made by the commander and not the "machine." The auto-
mated control equipment is a tool to be used by the commander
in making his decision and, when necessary, he must adjust
a decision developed by the system.
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In March of 1982, an article entitled "The Theory of
Control of the Navy" by Admiral V. Sysoyev was published
in Morskoy Sbornik . Admiral Sysayev makes a number of major
points that have already been discussed earlier. His reasons
for the development of a modern control system are the same
as Admiral Gorshkov's. He includes a quote from Gorshkov's
May, 1980, article which was examined earlier.
Automated control systems are also discussed as being a
very important part of the control system. Sysoyev again
bases his comments on Admiral Gorshkov's May, 1980, article.
He says that electronic computers and special control soft-
ware have permitted the automation of decision-making and
the creation of automated control systems. However, he also
points out that one-man command and the personal responsibil-
ity of commanders at all levels for the decisions they make
are important principles of control. This simply means that
it is the commander who should make the decision, not the
mathematical model.
The analysis of these articles has brought out some very
important Soviet perceptions concerning command and control.
The major points made in the articles examined are:
1. Modern day combat operations are characterized
by large spatial scope, accelerated tempo and sharp
variation in the situation during combat operations
at sea.
2. Good command and control is essential.
3. Control systems must provide both centralized
and decentralized control of forces.
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4. Since the control problem is complex, quality
control of forces can only be accomplished by auto-
mated control systems.
5. The basic purpose of automated control systems is
to assist the commanding officer in making the most
expedient decision.
The importance the Soviets place on command and control
and the points listed above can be readily seen in the six
articles viewed in this piece. This increase in the number
and emphasis on command and control related articles started
with a two-part series written by the Commander-in-Chief of
the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. Gorshkov. Gorshkov set the
emphasis and his article was followed by other articles
written by senior naval officers. All but one of the arti-
cles examined here were written by flag level officers.
Other related articles were published in Morskoy Sbornik
after the Admiral Gorshkov series. These articles focused on
specific areas of command and control; for example, in
December, 1980, "On the Problem of Evaluating the Relative
Strength of Opposing Forces" by Vice Admiral V. Babiy and
Captain 1st Rank N. Volgin and, in April, 1982, "Scientific
Principles for Employing Automated Control of Forces" by
Rear Admiral M. Iskanderov.
Another important observation is that all the major
points emphasized in the articles are made by using the same
(or nearly the same) phraseology. The three principal
phrases used were: large spatial scope, accelerated tempo,
and diverse situational variation.
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This would seem to indicate that a unity of views is
being established on certain basic ideas related to command
and control. The idea of unity of views, as stated earlier,
goes back to Russian political culture and is a requirement
for the development of any doctrine or undertaking.
Articles relating to command and control in the pages
of Morskoy Sbornik are nothing new; they can be found as
far back as the early 1960 's. However, a recent emphasis
on command and control is indicated by the events discussed
above. To review:
1. A major two-art series on command and control is
published in Morskoy Sbornik which is authored by
Admiral S. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet
Navy.
2. Admiral Gorshkov' s series is followed by a number
of other related articles, many of which are written
by flag officers.
3. Each related article reemphasizes basically the
same points made in the Gorshkov series,
4. The major points emphasized are made by using the
same (or close to the same) phrases. This indicates
an attempt to establish a unity of views.
C. THE COMMANDING OFFICER
Recently in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik
,
there has been
a surge in the number of articles which concern the commanding
officer. Articles on the topic are not new in the journal;
however, there seems to be a renewed emphasis lately.
All of these articles naturally point out that the
commanding officer is the key figure in the fleet. Diverse
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and complex duties are imposed on him, and he is held
strictly responsible for them. Because of the complex
nature and conditions of modern warfare, the demands
placed on the commanding officer are great.
The commanding officer is responsible for the combat
readiness of his ship. This means that the training of the
crew is of great importance. The commanding officer must be
bold and decisive in his tactical plans. He must also be
creative and not just use school book solutions. In this
way, he can act independently when the situation arises.
Therefore, the education and training of commanding
officers and future commanding officers is of great impor-
tance. Many of the articles make recommendations to improve
what they perceive as deficiencies in the training of current
and prospective commanding officers.
The surge in articles concerning commanding officers
began in March, 1981, with "We Raise Commanding Officers"
by Officer Ye. Chernov, Hero of the Soviet Union. Chernov
notes that the commanding officer has a special place in
achieving victory in modern naval warfare. He is the central
figure in the navy and is held strictly accountable for the
serious demands imposed upon him.
Contemporary naval warfare is fast-moving and highly
dynamic, with abrupt changes in the situation. The commander
must be able to quickly evaluate the situation, decide on a
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plan, and use not only textbook but also new tactics. The
ability to do this requires that he have a broad tactical
and technical perspective, use the principles of military
regulations and manuals skillfully, and be thoroughly familiar
with the combat capabilities of both his and the enemy's ship.
Cliernov views the work of preparing officers to fill
positions as ship commanders as a complex and multifaceted
process which is not always unified. He thinks that young
officers are only trained for the next higher position with-
out being taught those qualities which he will need later
when he becomes a department head or executive officer. This
sometimes results in a situation where an officer's training
to be a ship commander does not begin until he is an execu-
tive officer, and this is too late.
The article includes an example of an officer with
fifteen years of service who was considered unsuitable to
command a ship. He satisfactorily performed his work at
each successive position until he became the executive
officer of a ship. There he did not demonstrate the neces-
sary command qualities. The question being asked by the
Soviets is, "Why not?"
The article does not state how often the situation
described above occurs, but one gets the impression that it
happens more than the Soviet Navy would like. The rest of
the discussion outlines a program that will begin to prepare
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officers to fill command positions at an early stage in
their careers.
Chernov also comments that training continues even
after an officer is given command. The primary objective is
, . . to teach the commander to be a bold and decisive
tactician with a thorough knowledge of the equipment
and weapons , a skillful teacher of ideologically con-
firmed fighting men. The warship is designed for
battle. The outcome of the battle depends first of
all on the commander, on how he is able to make a plan
and use the ship and crew entrusted to him to carry it
out [Ref. 55].
The editors added a final note. They suggested that
commanders and political officers share their working know-
how in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik
.
"The Commanding Officer's Principal Concern Is Combat
Readiness" by Vice Admiral A. Kalinin was published in
December, 1981. Vice Admiral Kalinin, first deputy command-
ing officer of the Baltic Fleet, makes many of the same
points Chernov made in the previous article discussed.
Kalinin comments on the commanding officer's position as
the primary link to combat readiness and notes that he must
answer to the people, the party, and the state.
The article discusses the complexities of contemporary
naval warfare. It is characterized by highly technical
equipment, rapid movement, dynamism, diverse situations and
sudden, unexpected appearances by the enemy. Under such
conditions, only a fearless, strong-willed officer who has





Vice Admiral Kalinin views good training as very
important in the development of commanding officers. Not
only does it teach them technical and tactical knowledge,
but it developts initiative and independence. However, the
author notes that there are still cases where training is
worked out in a simplistic manner without considering con-
temporary conditions and that there are ships where old
training plans are copied over and over. He calls this a
"chronic lag in combat training." Kalinin concludes by
saying the officer training system must be aimed at training
skilled, experienced commanding officers.
In January, 1982, Morskoy Sbornik published an article
by Admiral Gorshkov. The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet
Navy's article, entitled "The Commanding Officer's Personal
Example," is a piece which expounds on the qualities and
duties of the commanding officer. He notes the commanding
officer is "the key figure in the fleet," and that his
responsibilities are affected by the constantly increasing
scale and complexity of modern naval warfare.
The author comments that one can still find cases where
commanding officers are failing in their duties because of
the lack of knowledge and zealousness and that the criteria
for the selection of commanding officers must be strict.
A concern for the commanding officer's proper formation
is a very important element in the making of a good commander,
He must have the proper knowledge and understanding to carry
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out his complex missions. Therefore, every effort must be
made to create favorable conditions for the all around
growth and formation of commanding officers. Gorshkov,
noting cases of poor leadership, re-emphasizes the training
and formation of commanding officers.
In August, 1982, an article entitled "Who Is to Be a CO?"
by Fleet Admiral N. Smirnov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, was published. Smirnov refers to and re-emphasizes
major points made in previously published articles concerning
commanding officers.
The author states that the role of the commanding officer
in the fleet has increased significantly in connection with
the increasing complexity of equipment, armements and tactics,
and that the task of training ship commander, the backbone
and central figures of the officer corps, is of great impor-
tance. The Soviet Navy must give constant attention to the
proper selection and training of commanding officers.
The author stresses that ship commanding officers and
candidates for this position must display intelligent initia-
tive and independence in accomplishing assigned missions.
He views imagination and initiative as applied to naval war-
fare as the creation of tactics that are new in concept and
execution but are based on established knowledge.
It is noted that poor professional training still occurs
at various levels of an officer's career and that this is
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the reason for mistakes and miscalculations. Proper pro-
fessional training provides sufficient schooling to command
and control ships, implement regulations and a sense of
personal responsibility to get the job done.
Fleet Admiral Smirnov ends by stating that it is impor-
tant to perform planned, purposeful work to train commanding
officers, and that this discussion in Morskoy Sbornik is
very important and requires further continuation.
The articles reviewed are only a few of those that were
published in the journal Morskoy Sbornik concerning the
commanding officer. Some of the others published are: "The
Staff and Combat Activity of a Commanding Officer" by
Admiral P. Naroytsev, February, 1982; "Teach CO ' s the Art of
Warfare" by the editorial staff, February, 1982; and another
editorial entitled "Tactical Proficiency Is an Index of the
GO'S Maturity," September, 1982. However, this is by no
means a complete list.
There are several substantive threads which can be
traced through all of the articles related to the commanding
officer. These are:
1. The commanding officer is the key figure in the
fleet.
2. Because of the complex nature and conditions of
modern warfare, the demands placed on the commanding
officer are great.





4. Due to the failures of some commanding officers
and candidate commanding officers , the officer
training system in the Soviet Navy is being reviewed.
It is obvious from the articles being published in the
journal that the Soviet Navy is not entirely satisfied with
their officer training system. Writings concerning command-
ing officers are not rare in Morskoy Sbornik
,
but there
seemed to be a steady increase in their number preceding
Chernov's piece. After Chernov's article, which included
a comment from the editorial staff inviting more opinions,
the articles greatly increased.
The articles allude to a problem in the preparation of
Soviet naval officers to assume a command position and the
training of commanding officers once in the position. It
seems that the junior officer is only prepared to fill the
next higher position and that purposeful training with the
ultimate objective of command is not being organized. This
results in a situation where these officers are not being
prepared for command until they are executive officers and
this, they feel, is too late. The Soviet Navy seems to
think there are too many cases where an officer rises to
executive officer and then is considered unsatisfactory
for a ship's command.
There are also cases where commanders fail in their
duties. This is also considered to be caused by poor
training. Sometimes it is blamed on the force commander's
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training of his CO ' s . Two reasons seem to surface from the
articles. First, the force commander does not give the CO
a chance to act on his own; he is "coddling" the ship
commander too much. Second, the force commander leaves the
training plan to someone else who just recopies an old,
outdated plan. In other words, they are just going through
the motions.
Most of the articles are written by well known senior
naval officers which seems to indicate the importance placed
on the topic. Many of the articles invite further comment
on how training can be improved to better prepare officers
for command at sea. Even Admiral Gorshkov himself remarks
that every effort must be made to upgrade all forms of
training.
Each piece written on the subject seems to emphasize
basically the same points and in the same way. Also note
many of the same phrases are frequently used.
Because of the complex nature and conditions of modern
warfare, great demands are placed on the commanding officer.
In order to meet these challenges, the commanding officer
must be bold, decisive and independent. Officers are not
born with these traits; they must be developed.
The Soviet Navy perceives a problem in its preparation
of officers for command because of the failures of some
commanding officers and candidate commanding officers.
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Therefore, the officer training system is being reviewed




Morskoy Sbornik is a monthly naval journal which has been
published since 1848. It is one of the oldest publications
in the Soviet Union and was one of a very few from the
czarist period which joined the Soviet Revolution.
During the early days of the Revolution, the journal
concerned itself with the development of Soviet naval think-
ing based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The magazine
also printed edicts of the Soviet authorities to help them
further the cause of the Revolution.
On November 29, 1917, Morskoy Sbornik was placed under
the control of the Naval General Staff. Thus, the journal
became an official press organ of the Soviet Navy. Articles
on military-political subjects, naval strategy and on foreign
navies and their performance were printed. The magazine
played an important part in shaping the views of Soviet
officers
.
Morskoy Sbornik 's popularity is still growing. Its
circulation has more than doubled in the last ten years.
This is due to the editorial staff who remain responsive
to the reader's needs and do everything possible to accom-
plish the magazine's missions.
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and Morskoy Sbornik
are often compared. In some respects the substantive
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articles in the Soviet journal are similar to those in
Proceedings . Both are aimed at a readership larger than
just naval officers (foreign as well as domestic) . The two
journals contain articles written by junior as well as senior
officers and civilian specialists.
However, the differences between the two are of more
importance. While Proceedings is a private publication
(not part of the U.S. Navy Department), Morskoy Sbornik
is an official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and the Soviet Navy. As an official organ, Morskoy
Sbornik is under the direct control of the Navy Military
Council. The council assigns tasks and indicates ways in
which they can be accomplished. The Soviet journal is also
rigidly censored by the Central Political Administration
of the Soviet Navy.
Some divergences peculiar to the Soviet journal are:
the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology, importance of
history, basing articles on the foreign press, and very
few open disagreements.
Morskoy Sbornik has three basic missions. First is to
foster a unity of views on the character and form of waging
a war at sea. Second is a forum for discussion and debate,
and third is the dissemination of useful information. Great
efforts are being made by the journal and Naval Military
Council to ensure these missions are being accomplished.
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By careful examination, one may gain a great deal of
information on Soviet views from the pages of Morskoy
Sbornik. Analysis of the number of articles, authors,
intensity of tone, and phraseology will uncover many Soviet
thoughts and views.
Morskoy Sbornik is a professional naval journal which
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